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FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
by
Joseph W MCKnight*
N O one will assert that the revision of the constitutional definition of
Texas marital property has revolutionized the subject. The revision
has, nonetheless, given the topic a new direction that, with proper imple-
mentation by the courts, may in time suggest new approaches to problems
and their solutions. The principal impact of the new definition will be on
characterization and management of marital property, with consequential
effects on division upon divorce as well as at death. In any case, Arnold v.
Leonard' will no longer have the central place in the system that it has had
for the past fifty-five years. Other suggestions of change are also on the
horizon. Allowing prison inmates conjugal visits was unsuccessfully pro-
posed at the 1979 session of the Texas Legislature. Ultimately something
may come of this suggestion, which has long been accepted practice in
Mexico.
At the 1979 session, legislation was also unsuccessfully proposed to
make spousal rape the subject of criminal prosecution. Although a subse-
quent study indicated that a substantial majority of the public polled does
not favor the creation of such an offense,2 this sort of legislation in all
likelihood will be proposed again. A suggestion that has been made from
time to time is merely to include rape among the various types of assault,
thereby bringing spousal rape within the definition. 3
I. STATUS
Informal Marriage. In the interval since the publication of the 1980 Sur-
vey, the Dallas court of civil appeals has withdrawn its initial opinion in
Claveria v. Estate of Claveria4 and has substituted a new one.5 In the new
opinion the court emphasized the factual elements supporting an inference
of agreement rather than the inference itself. Under section 1.91(b) of the
Family Code6 a judicial inference that a couple had agreed to be married
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
2. R. TESKE, F. WILLIAMS & T. DULL, TEXAs CRIME POLL, SPRING, 1980 SURVEY 23
(1980).
3. Barry, Spousal Rape. The Uncommon Law, 66 A.B.A.J. 1088, 1091 (1980); Com-
ment, Rape in Marriage. The Law in Texas and the Need/or Reform, 32 BAYLOR L. REV.
109, 117 (1980).
4. No. 20048 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas Sept. 21, 1979).
5. 597 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980), rev'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 229 (Feb.
14, 1981).
6. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon 1975).
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may not be entertained in the absence of a finding that the couple had
lived together as husband and wife and had held themselves out to the
public in that capacity. As to the holding-out requirement, the court stated
that proof of a single instance of acknowledging themselves as husband
and wife for the purpose of securing a mortgage loan was insufficient in
law to establish holding-out as husband and wife in general. 7 The Texas
Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision, holding that the record
contained some evidence of an informal marriage.8 The case was re-
manded to the appellate court to pass upon the factual sufficiency of the
evidence.9
Courts in various other states continue to extend the rights of persons
who under Texas law might be regarded as informally married. 10 Under
federal law unmarried couples have a right to demand that their incomes
be aggregated when a lender determines their credit worthiness in a joint
mortgage application, "l but for purposes of the dependency allowance for
federal income tax purposes, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit recently held that if cohabitation is violative of local law,
the constitutionality of that law may not be tested in the tax court. 12
Hence, if local law does not regard the relationship as unlawful, the claim
of the dependency deduction may properly be allowed. 13
A conflict of laws issue involving informal marriage was before the
Beaumont court of civil appeals in Braddock v. Taylor. 14 There the couple
had begun living together as husband and wife in Texas, but the woman
was unaware that the man was already married to someone else. This situ-
ation was very similar to that in Durr v. Newman. I' In Durr, however, the
couple continued to be domiciliaries of Texas even though the man
worked in New Mexico, a non-common-law-marriage state, and it was
during that time that he was divorced from his prior spouse. In Braddock
the man moved to California, where informal marriages cannot be entered
into, and while living there, the impediment to his remarriage was dis-
solved by divorce. The question in Braddock, just as in Durr, was whether
the relationship entered into in Texas ripened into a valid informal mar-
7. 597 S.W.2d at 439.
8. Claveria v. Estate of Claveria, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 229 (Feb. 14, 1981).
9. Id at 231.
10. See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Ffty States.- An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229,
276-83 (1981); Jennings, Unmarried Cohabitants." New Issues, New Answers, New Problems,
8 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 47, 51-52 (1981); Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 552 (1979).
11. See Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Loeb,
Equal Credit/Equal Management." Spousal Signatures in Community Property States, 34
PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 190 (1980); Note, Protection of Unmarried Couples Against
Discrimination in Lending Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act." Markam v. Colonial
Mortgage Service Co., 93 HARV. L. REV. 430 (1979).
12. Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1979).
13. Shackelford v. United States, 3 B.R. 42, 45 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Mo. 1980); see In re
Rivera, 5 B.R. 313 (Bankr. Ct. M.D. Fla. 1980).
14. 592 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. 537 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ refd n.r.e.), discussed in Mc-
Knight, Family Law.- Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105, 106
(1977).
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riage upon the removal of the impediment. The difference between the
two cases turns on maintenance or severance of the Texas domicile of the
spouse who was not free to enter into the alleged informal marriage. If the
domicile of the parties continues to be Texas, then Texas law will control
the marital relationship. If, however, the domicile of one of the parties is
changed, then Texas law no longer controls. Hence the court in Braddock
concluded that the removal of the disability while the husband was a dom-
iciliary of California did not affect the prior relationship commenced in
Texas. 16
A principal difficulty in proving an informal marriage after the death of
one of the parties is the dead man's statute.17 If the contestant of the mar-
riage elicits testimony from the proponent, however, the statute is waived,
and the witness may testify fully with regard to transactions with the dece-
dent that tend to prove the informal marriage.' 8
Although in Texas and some other states19 a bona fide spouse of a void
marriage is treated as a spouse for purposes of property acquisitions as
long as that person is unaware of impediments to the marriage, social se-
curity benefits are not available to putative spouses. In a case recently
decided by a federal court sitting in Nevada, 20 the Social Security Admin-
istration successfully interposed the invalidity of a foreign divorce of a first
marriage to invalidate the second marriage. In that instance the husband
had been granted a divorce from his first wife by a Mexican court. When
his second wife claimed social security benefits, the Administration suc-
cessfully argued that because neither the husband nor his first wife had
ever been domiciliaries of Mexico, the divorce was invalid and thus the
second marriage was void. 2' The court held that even though the second
wife had married the husband in good faith and did not know of the im-
pediment to the marriage, she could not claim social security benefits. 22
Privileged Testimony. In Trammel v. United States23 the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the federal rule24 that one spouse may not
testify against the other should be modified to allow the spouse-witness to
decide whether or not to testify.25 According to the Court, the spouse-
witness "may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testify-
16. 592 S.W.2d at 42.
17. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1925).
18. Smith v. Smith, 607 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
19. See Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. La. 1978).
20. Lugot v. Harris, 499 F. Supp. 1118 (D. Nev. 1980).
21. See also Thompson v. Harris, 504 F. Supp. 653, 654-55 (D. Mass. 1980). In Brag-
don v. Bragdon, 594 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. Civ. App.--"Amarilo 1980, no writ), the court
refused to allow an ex-husband to attack an Alabama divorce (void because neither party
was domiciled there) because he had relied on its validity in remarrying.
22. 499 F. Supp. at 1120.
23. 63 L. Ed. 2d 186, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980), discussed in Note, Modification of the Privi-
lege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony.- Trammel v. United States, 34 Sw. L.J. 1013 (1980).
24. See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S.
74 (1958).
25. 63 L. Ed. 2d at 196, 100 S. Ct. at 914.
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ing. ' ' 26 A later Texas case, however, noted that the decision in Trammel
did not affect the Texas privilege rule.27 Thus, in Texas courts, willingness
of a spouse to testify is not enough to remove the bar to the testimony.
28
Voluntary testimony given in certain exceptional circumstances, however,
is admissible.29
Interspousal Immunity. Although the Texas Supreme Court has not di-
rectly addressed the question of whether there might be recovery for negli-
gence in an interspousal case, a Texas court of civil appeals has held that a
cause of action does not lie. 30 On the other hand, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts has recently held that the doctrine of interspousal
immunity will not preclude recovery in a nonvehicular negligence case.
3
'
The law of domicile is controlling, however, over the lex loci delicti with
respect to a tort between non-Texas spouses. In Robertson v. Estate of
McKnight 32 a husband and wife who were both domiciled in New Mexico
were killed in an airplane crash that occurred in Texas. The husband was
the pilot of the plane. The estate of the wife brought an action in Texas for
wrongful death against the estate of the husband. The trial court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment because Texas law bars a
suit between spouses based on negligence. 33 The Tyler court of civil ap-
peals affirmed 34 and was then reversed by the Texas Supreme Court.35 Ar-
ticle 4678,36 as it read at the time of the deaths, dealt with choice of law in
tort cases, but it applied only to causes of action involving a death occur-
ring outside Texas. Accordingly, the court ruled that article 4678 was not
relevant to this case.37
In Robertson the applicable statute was article 4671,38 but because arti-
cle 4671 contained no statutory choice of law provisions for torts that oc-
curred within Texas, the court turned to the common law of Texas to
determine which state's law controlled. 39 Citing Gutierrez v. Collins,40 the
court concluded that the subject matter of the dispute was more signifi-
cantly related to the law of New Mexico than to that of Texas.41 The court
examined the record and found that it revealed "no contacts between [the]
interspousal relationship and Texas other than the fact that the accident
26. Id
27. Young v. Texas, No. 58-668 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 10, 1980).
28. Id
29. Note, supra note 23, at 1015-16.
30. Bruno v. Bruno, 589 S.W.2d 179, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
31. Brown v. Brown, 409 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Mass. 1980).
32. 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980).
33. Id at 535.
34. 591 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979).
35. 609 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex. 1980).
36. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 156, § 1, at 365; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678
(Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) (current version).
37. 609 S.W.2d at 536.
38. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
39. 609 S.W.2d at 536.
40. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
41. 609 S.W.2d at 537.
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* . . occurred in Texas."'42 The court rejected an argument that the New
Mexico rule permitting interspousal suits violated the public policy of
Texas.
43
Robertson is analogous to Lederle v. United Services Automobile Associa-
tion.4 Although the latter case lacks precedential value because the par-
ties settled, and the cause then before the supreme court was dismissed ab
initio, the conclusion reached by the Waco court of civil appeals in Lederle
is consistent with Robertson. In Lederle a Texas married woman was in-
jured while driving in Oklahoma. Applying the Texas law as understood
at the time, the court invoked the rule of domicile to preclude recovery on
the part of the wife in an accident in which the husband was a partici-
pant.45 On the other hand, a federal court sitting in New Mexico applied
the lex loci delicti rule in awarding relief to a Texas-domiciled wife who
was injured by her husband in New Mexico.4 6
In a Pennsylvania case,47 Maryland spouses brought an action for dam-
ages for injuries they suffered in an automobile collision with the defend-
ant in Pennsylvania. With respect to the cause of action of the wife, who
was the passenger, the defendant sought contribution against the husband.
The defendant was successful in this regard, because under Pennsylvania
law a husband-driver is not immune from liability for contribution in this
sort of case.48
In Lester v. United States49 the federal district court for the Northern
District of Texas concluded that a cause of action arising in Guam on
behalf of a Texas married woman would require the application of Texas
marital law for the determination of damages, although the law of Guam
would apply with respect to the determination of whether a cause of action
arose.50 This may be typified as a middle ground between the Texas and
Pennsylvania approaches to torts involving foreign spouses.
An interspousal vehicular tort may also involve the application of the
Texas guest statute. In Pomerantz v. Rosenberg5l the plaintiff-passenger
sued the driver, her deceased husband's brother, for injuries sustained in
an automobile accident. The court ruled that the action was barred under
the Texas guest statute52 because the plaintiff was within the second degree
of affinity to the driver of the automobile, and that the plaintiffs husband's
42. Id
43. Id
44. 394 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), writ dism'd by agr. per curiam, 400
S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1966), discussedin McKnight, Family Law. Annual Survey ofTexas Law,
24 Sw. L.J. 49, 51 (1970); Comment, Lederle-A Volefor the Domicile Rule in Interspousal
Conflict Causes, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 477 (1966).
45. 394 S.W.2d at 34.
46. Roberson v. U-Bar Ranch, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 730, 731-32 (D.N.M. 1968).
47. Krick v. Carter, 477 F. Supp. 152 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
48. Id at 156.
49. 487 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
50. Id. at 1039.
51. 593 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).
52. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b, § 1(a) (Vernon 1977).
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death did not terminate this relationship because there were living issue of
the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant's brother.5 3
Interspousal Crime. In Semaire v. Texas 54 a husband charged with the
killing of his wife pleaded self-defense. The accused had gone to an apart-
ment where his estranged wife was staying in order to exchange her coat
for some of his jewelry. She refused to admit him and told him to leave
the coat and that she would not return the jewelry. She also warned him
that she would start shooting if he did not go away. The husband broke
down the door and stumbled into the room but said that he had no inten-
tion of harming his wife. On glancing at his wife, the husband saw her
raise her hand, as though she was going to shoot him, and he thereupon
shot her. The wife died of the wounds inflicted, and the accused was pros-
ecuted for murder. The trial court refused to charge the jury on the issue
of self-defense. The court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction 5
The court reasoned that under the circumstances the wife's use of force
would not have been lawful as a matter of law, and the evidence did not
show conclusively that the accused provoked his wife's use of force.56 Be-
cause the accused husband denied any intent to harm his wife when he
broke into the apartment, the court ruled that the evidence created only a
question of fact for the jury on provocation: the accused was entitled to
have the jury decide whether he had a reasonable belief that he was justi-
fied in defending himself against the use of force that he believed was un-
lawful.5 7
Wife's Name. The primitive notion that identity is fixed by the name by
which one is called continues to require a legal response in some instances.
A corollary to this notion is that a wife's conventional use of her husband's
surname somehow requires her to refrain from using another surname for
other purposes. Rigid adherence to this sort of primitivism among court-
house bureaucrats is not surprising. In response to an inquiry by one such
bureaucrat, the Texas attorney general very properly advised that a mar-
ried woman may register to vote by using a hyphenated composite of her
maiden surname and that of her husband.5 8
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
AntenupialAgreements. Achieving the purposes of premarital agreements
and contracts is made a great deal easier under the amendment to article
XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution than it had been under the pred-
53. 593 S.W.2d at 818.
54. 612 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
55. Id at 531.
56. Id.
57. Id
58. TEX. ATT'y GEN. Op. No. MW-225 (1980).
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ecessor provision.5 9 The Matrimonial Property Act of 196760 provided
that marital property agreements between prospective spouses were effec-
tive even if they were merely agreements in writing and not otherwise con-
tractual. Because the property regime of the parties to such agreements is
constitutionally defined once marriage ensues, the statute failed to achieve
its purpose to the extent that the parties attempted to alter the character of
their future community acquisitions. The constitutional definition of mari-
tal property was construed with such strictness that it was almost as diffi-
cult to enter into a valid premarital undertaking affecting marital
acquisitions during the course of a marriage as it was to enter into the
same sort of undertaking during marriage. In Williams v. Williams6 1 the
Texas Supreme Court clearly enunciated the proposition that if property
acquired as community property was sought to be affected by such an
agreement, performance of formalities with respect to the property was
necessary in order to give the premarital agreement its intended effect.62
Consequently, the utility of such agreements was curtailed seriously. The
1980 constitutional amendment responded to the need for reform necessi-
tated by Williams.
The self-executing constitutional amendment of 1980 makes it possible
for persons intending to marry to provide that what would otherwise be
community property, because acquired during the marriage, will be sepa-
rate property. In drafting such agreements, however, counsel for each
party should be particularly careful to insure that the other party under-
stands the terms of the agreement. 63 Further, in order to preclude a future
assertion of fraud, duress, or overreaching, it is virtually imperative that
59. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; see McKnight & Davis, For Amendment No. 9, 43 TEX.
B.J. 921 (1980). The amended version reads:
§ 15. Separate and community property of husband and wife
All property, both real and personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before
marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be the
separate property of that spouse; and laws shall be passed more clearly defin-
ing the rights of the spouses, in relation to separate and community property;
provided that persons about to marry and spouses, without the intention to
defraud pre-existing creditors, may by written instrument from time to time
partition between themselves all or part of their property, then existing or to
be acquired, or exchange between themselves the community interest of one
spouse or future spouse in any property for the community interest of the
other spouse or future spouse in other community property then existing or to
be acquired, whereupon the portion or interest set aside to each spouse shall
be and constitute a part of the separate property and estate of such spouse or
future spouse; and the spouses may from time to time, by written instrument,
agree between themselves that the income or property from all or part of the
separate property then owned by one of them, or which thereafter might be
acquired, shall be the separate property of that spouse; and if one spouse
makes a gift of property to the other that gift is presumed to include all the
income or property which might arise from that gift of property.
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1955-1980).
60. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 888, § 1, at 2729; see McKnight & Davis, supra note 59.
61. 569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978), discussed in McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and
W'fe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 105-08 (1979).
62. 569 S.W.2d at 870.
63. See Babb v. Babb, 604 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ark. 1980) (ante-nuptial agreement valid
because no fraud or misunderstanding).
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both parties be represented by independent counsel. A problem may be
encountered, however, with regard to the compensation of counsel for the
party who is less able to pay an appropriate fee. To deal with this prob-
lem, provisions for the payment of the fee of both parties can be built into
the agreement as part of a formula for the payment of future taxes and
related matters.64
The language of the agreement should be carefully drawn to track the
terms of the amended constitution. The constitution now contains two
provisions of different breadth. First, spouses or proposed spouses are al-
lowed to partition any future acquisitions that would be community prop-
erty, that is, income from separate property or earnings. 65 Secondly, there
is a provision that allows the spouses to agree that income from separate
property will be the separate property of the owner of the property produc-
ing the income. 66 This latter provision was inserted to deal specifically
with the estate tax cases that prompted the amendment. 67 Because the par-
tition provision embraces both earnings and income from separate prop-
erty and the agreement provision covers only income from separate
property, instruments that are intended to cover earnings as well as income
from separate property should be specifically stated in terms of partition,
as that word is used in the constitution. Because there may be implement-
ing legislation related to the constitutional provision, the terms of that leg-
islation should be carefully followed in the drafting of future partitions
and agreements.68
Counsel will want to familiarize themselves with the general property
consequences, as well as the tax consequences, of agreements that they
seek to draw. Because similar agreements have long been recognized in
64. See Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 227 (1977), rev'd, 610 F.2d 1282 (5th
Cir. 1980).
65. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; see note 59 supra.
66. Id
67. Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682 (1977), rev'd, 610 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.
1980); Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 227 (1977), rev'd, 610 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.
1980).
68. See Roberts, Texas Family Code.- Separate Property Amendments, 44 TEX. B.J. 50
(1981). The proposal is that each agreement have this or substantially similar language:
"EACH PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT BY SIGNING
THIS DOCUMENT HE OR SHE MAY BE PERMANENTLY SURRENDERING
CLAIMS HE OR SHE WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE UNDER TEXAS LAW TO IN-
COME OR PROPERTY DERIVED FROM SEPARATE PROPERTY OF HIS OR HER
SPOUSE." Id at 51 (emphasis in original). This proposal ought not to be enacted. Insist-
ing that each party be represented by independent counsel is far more to the point. The
requirement of such a recital is not only demeaning to the intelligence of the parties, but
puts an undue requirement of formality on the undertaking. If such a provision is included
and if the proponent of the agreement has the burden of showing a lack of fraud in reaching
the agreement, it may be all the evidence that a proponent of an agreement will need to
discharge his burden of showing that the other party gave informed consent. Indeed, if the
agreement is sworn to before a notary, as such agreements frequently are, this provision
would be prima facie evidence of the truth of the statement made and would shift any bur-
den of the proponent to the contestant. The validity of agreements entered into in states
without such recitals might also be unnecessarily questioned. In drafting the amendment, it
was thought sufficient that the agreement should be in writing. See also Estate of Bright v.
United States, 619 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1980); 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1119 (1979).
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such community property jurisdictions as Louisiana and California, along
with separate property jurisdictions, 69 counsel may want to consider the
experience with such agreements in sister states. Additionally, counsel
should explore the possibility of providing for the consequences of di-
vorce70 and death in such agreements.71 As used in other states, agree-
ments of this sort frequently include provisions with respect to the division
of property on divorce. Pending divorce, provisions abrogating the duty of
support of a spouse or of children, however, cannot necessarily be relied
upon as binding.
Spousal Partitions and Agreements. Prior to 1963,72 the contractual capac-
ity of a Texas woman of full age altered significantly, upon her marriage,
and the law of interspousal agreements reflected that change. Although
Texas law gave effect to premarital agreements by engaged couples for
limited purposes, 73 interspousal transactions during marriage were se-
verely limited by the wife's lack of general capacity to enter into enforce-
able agreements, 74 the policy of the law to protect the married woman
from the undue influence of her husband, 75 and the independent policy of
protecting creditors of the marriage. 76 The only circumstance in which
spouses were allowed to convert their community property into separate
property, except by gift, was the partition of community property in antici-
pation of divorce.77 Not until the Texas Constitution was amended in
1948 was it possible for spouses to partition their community property
whenever they chose; even then, however, completed partitions of future
acquisitions could not be made. Although the weight of judicial precedent
would have allowed such a partition on separation, 78 the language of the
constitution, if literally construed, forbade a partition of nonexistent com-
munity property in that instance as well. Under the 1980 revision of the
constitutional definition of marital property, partitions of future acquisi-
tions of community property are clearly allowed and, as the term "parti-
69. See Bartke, Marital Sharing-Why Not Do It By Contract?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1131
(1979).
70. See Greschler v. Greschler, 71 A.D.2d 322, 422 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1979) (by striking
down New York constitutional provision, court did not specifically indicate that premarital
agreements would control in cases dealing with consequences of divorce).
71. See Ingram, Premarital and Marital Planningfor Preservation of Separate Property,
in MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION IN TEXAS 1980, ch. A., app. E at E-I I to E-16 (State Bar of
Texas 1980).
72. See 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 472, §§ 1-6, at 1188-89.
73. See Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964) (prenuptial agreement that income
arising from property would remain separate was invalid); Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgmt adopted) (spousal agreement that property acquired dur-
ing marriage would be separate property was void).
74. See Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902).
75. See Protzel v. Schroeder, 83 Tex. 684, 19 S.W. 292 (1892).
76. See Cox v. Miller, 54 Tex. 16 (1880).
77. See Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390, 13 S.W. 324 (1890).
78. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey ofTexas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31,
32 (1972); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129,
134 n.36 (1968).
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tion" has already been defined by statutory usage, 79 a partition may be in
unequal shares as applied to a particular property or unequal shares of
different properties. A partition, however, must involve a division so that
each spouse takes some part of the community property; if one takes all,
there is no partition. The same admonitions are applicable to partitions or
agreements between spouses as antenuptial agreements. 80
Separate Property Acquired by Gift or Inheritance. In spite of the availabil-
ity of marital property agreements, the principal sources of separate prop-
erty will continue to be property brought into the marriage, that acquired
during the marriage by gift or inheritance, and those acquisitions that rep-
resent the value of physical or psychic loss. One of the curiosities of Texas
marital property law is that a gift to both spouses is interpreted as a ten-
ancy in common shared by both as separate property.8 1 This result rests
merely on the actual intention of the donor or the constitutional language
that associates acquisition by gift with separate rather than community
property. In other community property systems, however, it is almost uni-
versally held that the community can be the recipient of a gift.82 The
Texas view, that a deed of gift to the husband and wife causes each to take
a half interest as separate property, was recently reiterated in White v.
White .83
A far more complicated, but perhaps more rational, set of rules governs
transactions between Texas spouses. For example, there is a presumption
of gift when one spouse transfers separate or community property to the
other 84 or buys property in the name of the other using the separate cash of
the purchaser to pay the purchase price. 85 An alleged recent example of
the latter type of transaction is Purser v. Purser,86 in which the husband
asserted that he used his separate funds to purchase realty in the names of
both himself and his wife. The evidence, however, was insufficient to
prove that the property was paid for at its inception with the husband's
separate property, and, thus, the court concluded that the presumption of
gift did not arise.87 If the presumption of gift had applied,88 however, and
79. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.42 (Vernon 1975); 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 577, § 1, at
2729; 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 309, § 1, at 738; 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 242, § I, at 450.
80. See text accompanying notes 63 and 65-68 supra.
81. See Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 (1883).
82. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 155-56
(1971). See also Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803. Sociedad de Gananciales,
30 LA. L. REV. I (1969).
83. 590 S.W.2d 587, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1979, no writ).
84. See Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314 (1856).
85. See Higgins v. Johnson's Heirs, 20 Tex. 389 (1857).
86. 604 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
87. Id. at 414. Insufficient and unconvincing evidence to disprove presumed intent is a
common pitfall in these cases. See, e.g., Hampshire v. Hampshire, 485 S.W.2d 314, 316
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, no writ) (husband failed to rebut presumption that hus-
band and wife grantees each acquire a one-half interest in property conveyed by deed);
Patterson v. Metzing, 424 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ)
(husband's evidence so meager and unsatisfactory that it could not rebut presumption of
community property); cf. Peterson v. Peterson, 595 S.W.2d 889, 892-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (husband's intention not to make a gift proved).
88. The court further noted that if it had been proved that separate funds had been used
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the wife had taken an undivided interest in the property, the terms of the
recently adopted constitutional amendment 89 would cause the income pro-
duced by the donee's share of the property to be her separate estate, while
the income produced by the husband's share would be community prop-
erty.
A situation was presented in Duke v. Duke90 that is difficult to resolve.
Prior to marriage the husband entered into a contract to buy land and paid
earnest money as part of the contract price, but he directed that the title be
put in the name of himself and his named "wife," a woman he married
soon afterward. The conveyance was made during the marriage as the
husband had directed. Though this apparent acquisition during marriage
made the property presumptively community, the fact that the purchase
occurred prior to marriage would make the property the husband's sepa-
rate property,9' were it not for the form of the title, made in accordance
with the purchaser's prior instructions. There is, therefore, a suggested in-
tention of gift of an undivided half of the property, though there is no
presumption of gift under these circumstances. The appellate court, how-
ever, side-stepped this issue by concluding that the contract of sale was
merged into the deed,92 and, thus, the facts of the sale were screened effec-
tively from legal view.
Tracing. The principal means of rebutting the presumption that all prop-
erty acquired during marriage is community are (1) showing that the prop-
erty was acquired by gift or inheritance, (2) showing that the property was
acquired prior to marriage, and (3) tracing the existing property to a sepa-
rate property source. In Batmanis v. Batmanis93 the heirs of a deceased
spouse were able to show that certain certificates of deposit could be traced
to similar certificates held by the decedent prior to his marriage. 94 In an-
other case involving the purchase of realty, the purchasing spouse was able
to trace the purchase price to separate proceeds of inherited property de-
posited in his bank account and withdrawn within one month of his mar-
riage.95 The appellate court sustained the finding of the trial court by
"viewing the evidence in its entirety, '96 although no evidence was intro-
duced to establish the beginning balance of the account into which the
funds were deposited or to establish what deposits or withdrawals were
made between the date of marriage and the date of the withdrawal. This
to buy the land, the husband's evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption of gift that
would have arisen. 604 S.W.2d at 414.
89. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; see note 59 supra.
90. 605 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ dism'd).
91. See Evans v. Ingram, 288 S.W. 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1926, no writ).
92. 605 S.W.2d at 410.
93. 600 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
94. Id at 889.
95. Peterson v. Peterson, 595 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
96. Id at 892.
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approach may be appropriate for dealing with claims for reimbursement,
but not for tracing.
Another conclusion reached in Batmanis is difficult to square with the
decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Tarver v. Tarver.97 Tarver in-
volved the problem of untangling the claims of two successive communi-
ties when claimants of the first community, asserting the right of their
deceased parent, made a claim against the second community for funds of
the first allegedly commingled therein. In Tarver the supreme court held
that the burden of tracing was on the claimants of the first community and
that the fiduciary situation of the survivor of the first community did not
affect this burden of proof.98 Without citing Tarver, the court in Batmanis
held that the claimants of the first marriage succeeded in their obligation
of tracing by showing that a specific amount of rents and dividends had
been collected during the second marriage from property that was the de-
ceased parent's share of the first community. 99 These funds were depos-
ited in the checking account of the surviving parent of the first community
and there were commingled with the funds of the second community. In
this instance, the court said that the survivor's responsibility as a trustee
allowed the beneficiaries to trace the funds into the trustee's new invest-
ments made with commingled funds.'°° The court attempted to legitimize
its departure from the holding in Tarver by relying on a variant of the first-
in-first-out rule recently relied on in tracing cases: "where, as here, the
trustee comingles [sic] trust money with his own and money is expended, it
will be presumed that his own money is expended first." '0' Thus, the court
held that the first community was entitled to recovery of the rents and
dividends. 102
As an aid to tracing the courts have developed a rule that when an ac-
count contains both separate and community funds, withdrawals for com-
munity purposes will be deemed to be community funds, thereby leaving
separate funds within the account. 03 The utilization of this rule was dubi-
ously employed in Batmanis '04 and is certainly inapplicable to show that a
purchase was made with separate funds when money is merely withdrawn
from a commingled account to make a purchase during marriage that
97. 394 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1965).
98. Id at 783.
99. 600 S.W.2d at 890.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. In Gentry v. Marburger, 596 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1980, writ refd n.r.e.), which also involved successive community estates, the executor of the
first wife sought the power of a justice court in evicting the second wife from property in
which the first community claimed an interest. The court concluded that the justice court
lacked jurisdiction of a forcible detainer suit in this instance because questions of title to the
property were directly involved. Id at 203-04.
103. See Harris v. Ventura, 582 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ);
Sibley v. Sibley, 286 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ dism'd).
104. 600 S.W.2d at 890.
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would otherwise be characterized as a community acquisition. 05
When a purchase is made during marriage it is presumptively commu-
nity property. 10 6 The same is true with respect to a loan of money to a
spouse. The money borrowed by the spouse is deemed to be community
property unless the lender clearly looks only to the separate estate of the
borrowing spouse for repayment. In Mortenson v. Trammell10 7 the court
misapplied this rule. The wife borrowed funds from a lender and assigned
her separate property as collateral for the note that was made in her name
only. The court concluded from these facts that the lender had looked to
her separate credit and, therefore, the money borrowed would be separate
property.'08 From the report, however, the lender appeared not to have
looked solely to the wife's separate credit. Even though the lender on de-
fault might have had recourse to the separate collateral, the lender appar-
ently was not so restricted, and in any case, if the collateral had been
insufficient to cover the amount of the loan, recourse could have been had
against the community. 109 In previous cases this rule has been very strictly
applied. 110
Federal Retirement Benefits. Since the United States Supreme Court
decided Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,I ' which defined federal railroad retire-
ment benefits as the separate property of the employee-spouse based on
the intent of Congress, Texas courts have held that federal railroad retire-
ment and other benefits are not "property" subject to division on di-
vorce."l 2 This reasoning has been employed in various situations,'13
including cases involving Veterans Administration disability benefits.' 14
105. See Kuehn v. Kuehn, 594 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980,
no writ) (first withdrawals from bank account presumed community).
106. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
107. 604 S.W.2d 269, 275-76 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
108. Id. at 276.
109. Equally unjustified is the conclusion that an obligation is owed by the community
because the liability was secured by community property. Aronson v. Aronson, 590 S.W.2d
189, 190-91 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
110. See, e.g., Brussard v. Tian, 156 Tex. 371, 295 S.W.2d 405 (1956) (vendor's lien note
executed during marriage by husband presumed a community obligation); Gleich v. Bongio,
128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937) (property acquired on community credit and money
borrowed on community obligation is community property); Carter v. Grabeel, 341 S.W.2d
458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, no writ) (obligation to pay deferred purchase price of
property deeded to wife after marriage presumed a community debt). See also Bell v. Bell,
593 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (when separate cash
and community credit are used in making a purchase, the property purchased is held as a
tenancy in common between the separate and community estate in the proportion each bears
to the purchase price).
111. 439 U.S. 572 (1979). For another aspect of railroad retirement benefits, see United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1980).
112. Perez v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Tex. 1979) (military retirement pay); Eichel-
berger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 401 (Tex. 1979) (railroad retirement pay).
113. See McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of the Texas Law,
34 Sw. L.J. 115, 121-23 (1980).
114. See Exparte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1979); Exp .arte Pummill, 606 S.W.2d
707 (Tex. Civ. App.7-Fort Worth 1980); Arrambide v. Arrambide, 601 S.W.2d 197, 198-99
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ); Johnson & Anderson, Divorce and Veterans Bene-
fits, 44 TEX. B.J. 78 (1981). In Arrambide, 601 S.W.2d at 198-99, the ex-husband had ex-
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The United States Supreme Court is expected to determine shortly
whether the rule in Hisquierdo is applicable to all federal military retire-
ment benefits." I 5 Civil service retirement benefits, however, are treated as
community property on the basis of the provision in the federal statute
stating that community property benefits in civil service retirement pay
may be divided by a divorce court. 116 A different sort of federal statute, 'i7
however, was struck down as unconstitutional when applied in community
property states. 1 8 This statute prescribed a presumption that income of a
husband would be treated as his separate property unless the wife exer-
cised substantial management and control over it." 19 The application of
this rule was construed as discriminating against married women in com-
munity property jurisdictions, in violation of the equal protection clause of
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.120
Disconcerting comments appear in Gaudion v. Gaudion l2 ' to the effect
that residence rather than domicile controls the character of earnings in
the nature of federal retirement benefits. In that divorce case the husband
asserted that the interest accumulated toward his retirement while he was
stationed in Texas was not community property but rather was a separate
interest because he had continuously maintained his domicile in a com-
mon law state. If this was indeed true, the property should have been
characterized as separate. The court merely held that residence controlled,
without carefully considering the fact of domicile. 2 2
Two recent cases considered an attorney's liability to his client for fail-
ure to raise the issue of divisibility of military retirement benefits at the
time of the divorce proceeding. In Perkins v. Barrera 123 the former wife
sued her attorney for the amount to which she would be entitled in a parti-
tion of retirement benefits not dealt with in her divorce in 1967. At that
time, the husband already was retired and receiving retirement benefits.
There was a dispute as to whether the attorney advised the wife of her
rights in the 1967 divorce action. Following the divorce, however, a settle-
ment had been reached between the ex-spouses with respect to the ex-
changed his military retirement benefits for Veterans Administration benefits. The ex-wife
questioned the propriety and consequences of the exchange. See Valdez v. Ramirez, 574
S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex. 1978), discussed in McKnight, supra note 61, at 146; Dessommes v.
Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673, 678-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), dis-
cussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 73-73 (1974).
115. See McCarty v. McCarty, No. 45056 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1980), discussed in 8
COMMUNITY PROP. J. 71-72 (1981). Texas courts have continued to treat ordinary military
retirement benefits as community property. McGinty v. McGinty, 592 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ dism'd).
116. See Cowan v. Plsek, 592 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(5)(A) (1976).
118. Hester v. Harris, 631 F.2d 53, 57 (5th Cir. 1980); Carrasco v. Secretary of HEW, 628
F.2d 624, 630-31 (Ist Cir. 1980).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(5)(A) (1976).
120. Hester v. Harris, 631 F.2d 53, 57 (5th Cir. 1980); Carrasco v. Secretary of HEW, 628
F.2d 624, 630-31 (Ist Cir. 1980).
121. 601 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
122. Id at 807.
123. 607 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
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wife's claim for her community interest in the retirement benefits. In her
suit against the lawyer, the ex-wife did not seek consequential damages.
The trial court entered summary judgment against the ex-wife, and the
court of civil appeals affirmed.' 24 On rehearing the appellate court con-
cluded that even if the attorney had failed to advise his client of her rights,
she had been fully compensated for the rights she had allegedly lost by her
settlement with her former husband. 125
In Medrano v. Miller, 126 however, it was the husband who sued his law-
yer for malpractice in that the lawyer had failed to have the husband's
nonvested military retirement benefits adjudicated in his 1972 divorce pro-
ceeding. A majority of the San Antonio court of civil appeals held that
because the law was unsettled at the time of the divorce as to the partition-
ability of nonvested military retirement benefits, the attorney, who was not
shown to have acted otherwise than in good faith on behalf of his client,
was not negligent in failing to get an adjudication of the interest in the
benefits. 127 Chief Justice Cadena, however, could not agree that the attor-
ney was not negligent as a matter of law.' 28 He nonetheless concurred
with the majority's disposition of the case on the narrower ground that the
ex-husband's rights against his attorney, if any, were barred by the statute
of limitation. 129
Loss of Consortium and Workers' Compensation Claims. In W*hittlesey v.
Miller 30 the Texas Supreme Court made it clear that the wife as well as
the husband has a cause of action for loss of consortium and that the re-
covery is the separate property of the plaintiff-spouse.' 3' The court con-
cluded that the rule would be applied prospectively, but was not binding
under the principle of stare decisis. 132 In Newman v. Minyard Food Stores,
Inc. 133 the husband's injury that gave rise to the wife's complaint occurred
ten months prior to the supreme court's decision in Whittlesey. Neverthe-
less, the court concluded that a cause of action would lie. 134 In Copelin v.
Reed Tool Co. '35 the principles involved in this sort of cause of action
were defined in greater detail. Although the workers' compensation stat-
ute' 36 exempts the employer of the injured worker-spouse from liability
124. Id at 7.
125. Id. at 7-8.
126. 608 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
127. Id at 784.
128. Id at 785 (Cadena, C.J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978); see Note, An Expanded Cause of Action in Texas-
Whittiesey v. Miller.- Either Spouse May Recoverfor the Negligent Impairment of Consortium,
33 Sw. L.J. 895 (1979).
131. 572 S.W.2d at 668, 669.
132. Id at 669.
133. 601 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ grantedper curiam, 24 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 116 (Dec. 20, 1980)).
134. Id at 757.
135. 596 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), aff'd, 610 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.
1980).
136. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
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arising from the worker's negligence and hence precludes the other
spouse's action in those instances, the employer is not exempt from liabili-
ties that arise for intentional injuries inflicted by the employer on an em-
ployee. Thus, the worker's spouse has a cause of action outside the
statutory scheme, and the recovery is characterized as the separate estate of
the recovering spouse. 137
Although there is no question that ordinary earnings, and compensation
for their loss, are community property, difficult questions of characteriza-
tion have arisen from time to time with respect to earnings that one spouse
may make when employed by the other. Some old cases rejected the idea
of a contract between spouses for wages when Texas statutes concerning a
married woman's contractual capacity and powers of management over
community property were significantly different. '3 8 A contrary view, how-
ever, was even then expressed when employment was within a business
context. 139 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Roberts140 posed a
question regarding the compensability of professional services rendered by
one spouse to the other in the context of a workers' compensation claim.
Although the court held that the serving spouse could not recover under
workers' compensation law for services usually rendered under normal cir-
cumstances,' 4' the court stated that a wife might recover for nursing serv-
ices customarily performed by persons engaged in nursing activity when
the husband was in need of such services as a result of an injury for which
workers' compensation was sought.' 42
Intestate Succession. From time to time the suggestion has been made that
the Texas rule with respect to intestate succession to community property
be changed so that the surviving spouse would take the whole of the de-
ceased spouse's community interest. Since 1844 Louisiana has maintained
the rule that if a spouse dies intestate, a life estate, terminable upon remar-
riage, in the deceased spouse's community share passes to the surviving
spouse if all of the descendants of the decedent are also those of the surviv-
ing spouse.' 43 The State Bar of Texas has proposed that Texas should
follow Louisiana's lead in making the surviving spouse the absolute taker
137. See Rubinstein, Personal Injuries and the Texas Survival Statute. The Case for Re-
covery of Damagesfor a Decedent's Lost Future Earnings, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 49 (1980).
138. See Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S.W.2d 152 (1931); Pottorffv. J.D. Adams Co.,
70 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1934, writ ref'd).
139. See In re Gutierrez, 33 F.2d 987 (S.D. Tex. 1929).
140. 598 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
141. Id at 50; see Transport Ins. Co. v. Polk, 400 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1966); Finch v.
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 564 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
142. 598 S.W.2d at 51. The effects of remarriage on a widow's workers' compensation
benefits are dealt with in Blankenship v. Highlands Ins. Co., 594 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Daflas 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.); Freeman v. Texas Compensation Ins. Co., 586 S.W.2d
172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979), aftd, 603 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1980) (upon remarriage,
widow's share of death benefits is redistributed to minor beneficiaries); cf Cruz v. Hendy
Int'l Co., 638 F.2d 719, 726-27 (5th Cir. 1981) (seaman's spouse's suit in admiralty for loss of
society does not include recovery for value of home nursing services).
143. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 915 (West Supp. 1981).
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of the decedent's community share in that situation.44 Although opinions
may differ as to the wisdom of the basic thrust of this proposal, there are
details inherent in the proposal that need further attention. For example,
the estates of persons who have intended to die intestate relying on the
present law should not be affected in those instances when testamentary
power no longer can be exercised because of a lack of testamentary capac-
ity. Louisiana law may also be looked to for guidance in approaching
some of the broader ramifications of the proposal. First, if the deceased
spouse is survived by common descendants of the surviving spouse and the
surviving spouse takes the whole of the community estate, there is little
reason for the present rule providing a life estate in a third of the separate
realty and a third of the personalty outright for the surviving spouse. This
is a common law departure from community property concepts of succes-
sion that Louisiana has never adopted. Secondly, however, in the case of
the surviving spouse who still might not adequately be provided for with
the decedent's share of the community because the entire community es-
tate is small, or in the case of a surviving spouse who will not take the
decedent's share of the community because there are descendants of the
decedent not descending from the survivor, the family allowance of the
surviving spouse should be expanded along the lines of the Louisiana mari-
talfourth.145 Thus, the surviving spouse could be provided an allowance
for an amount to be fixed by the court, up to a fourth of the separate estate
of the decedent. Further, if the one-year limitation 46 on the family allow-
ance were also removed, the allowance could be treated as a marital de-
duction for estate tax purposes.
With respect to succession taxes, proposals have been made for amend-
ment of the Texas inheritance tax scheme to take advantage of federal
credits allowed for state estate taxes paid. 147 The state would profit by
these taxes, which otherwise would be payable to the federal govern-
ment. '
48
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
Interspousal Transfers and Partitions. In Bassett v. Bassett 149 a former hus-
band brought suit against his former wife to cancel a deed made during
their marriage, by which property of the husband was conveyed to the wife
pursuant to the wife's promise made prior to marriage that she would
move to the husband's city of residence and live with him there as his wife.
After the conveyance was made, the wife refused to comply with her prom-
144. See Quiiam, Texas Probate Code. Intestate Succession to Community Property, 44
TEX. B.J. 40 (1981).
145. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2432-2434 (West Supp. 1981).
146. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 287 (Vernon 1980).
147. I.R.C. §2011.
148. Brian, Inheritance Tax "Pick-up" Statute. Computation of Tax, 44 TEX. B.J. 46
(1981); McMahan, Texas Inheritance Tax Statute. Computation of the State Death Tax, 44
TEX. B.J. 43 (1981).
149. 590 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ dism'd).
19811
SOUTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
ise. Under the law as it stood prior to the revision of the constitutional
definition of marriage contracts and interspousal transactions, 50 an agree-
ment that one spouse would make a conveyance to the other in considera-
tion of a promise of marriage was valid if it was in writing.' 51 A
conveyance made in compliance with an unwritten and therefore unen-
forceable agreement was nonetheless valid.' 52 In Bassett the agreement
that impelled the conveyance was actuated by fraud, and the conveyance
was therefore set aside.' 53 The grantee sought to defend on the ground
that the promise in question was unenforceable because it was against pub-
lic policy, and that such a promise, even if fraudulently made, could not
serve as a basis for the former husband's action. The court noted that the
action was for the cancellation of a deed based on fraud in the induce-
ment.' 54 The court held, therefore, that the defrauding party could not
defend on the ground that the transaction induced by fraudulent promises
was illegal or against public policy. 55
One of the principal objects of the constitutional reform of 1980 was to
provide a climate of law in which spouses are allowed greater freedom in
readjusting their property interests. Not a stated objective of the drafts-
men of the provision 56 or its proponents, 57 however, was that the amend-
ment would dispose of the barrier set up by the Texas Supreme Court in
Hilley v. Hilley158 and Williams v. McKnight,159 which precluded spousal
conversion of community property into a joint tenancy. Prior to the adop-
tion of the amendment, the Beaumont court of civil appeals decided Ma-
ples v. Nimitz,' 60 holding that by executing account cards and nothing
more, spouses could not convert a community bank account into a joint
tenancy account with right of survivorship.' 61 As had been pointed out
earlier in Hilley, such a result could be achieved only if the spouses first
transformed their community property into shares of separate property
and then recombined it as a joint tenancy.' 62
The constitutional amendment allows spouses to partition as shares of
separate property their presently held community property, as well as that
which they may acquire in the future. 63 The question then is whether, in
spite of Hilley and Williams, spouses may now agree in writing to partition
150. See notes 59-80 supra and accompanying text.
151. Ellington v. Ellington, 29 Tex. 2, 6 (1867); Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855, 858
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgmt adopted).
152. McFadden v. McFadden, 213 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948,
mand. overr.).
153. 590 S.W.2d at 532.
154. Id at 533.
155. Id.
156. See McKnight, supra note 113, at 120 & n.43.
157. See McKnight & Davis, supra note 59, at 921.
158. 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
159. 402 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1966).
160. 610 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ granted).
161. Id at 797.
162. 161 Tex. at 579, 342 S.W.2d at 571.
163. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; note 59 supra.
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their community property (both presently held and to be acquired in the
future) as a particular kind of separate property holding, that is, as a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship, without first partitioning the property
as general separate property. Although the new language of the constitu-
tion does not specifically address this point, such an interpretation of its
language seems reasonable. 164 Legislation has been introduced to achieve
this result. 165 Even if direct conversion of a community interest into a
joint tenancy is allowed under the amendment, the question of whether the
spouses actually intended that result will still remain in some instances.
The issue of whether the parties to the creation of an ostensible joint ten-
ancy meant to create such an estate or merely meant to create a conven-
ience account in which the nature of the funds was not altered has also
arisen in connection with nonspousal transactions.166 Parol evidence is ad-
missible in such cases to show that the parties did not intend to create a
joint tenancy in the strict sense. 167
Transactions Affecting Separate Property Liability. Spouses' activities in
their dealings with third persons may present ambiguous situations with
respect to the binding nature of their mutual undertakings. In Little v.
Clark,168 for example, a husband entered into negotiations with a real es-
tate agent concerning the payment of the cost of a real estate appraisal of
certain community property, apparently subject to the joint management
of the spouses. At the closing of the transaction, the wife, acting for herself
and for her husband, purported to bind both parties. In a dispute that later
arose between the husband and the real estate agent, the court concluded
that inferences could be drawn from the facts surrounding the conversa-
tions between the husband and the real estate agent, and from the tenor of
those conversations, to establish a confirmation of authority for the wife to
execute the agreement on the husband's behalf, thus entitling the third per-
son to enforce the contract.1 69
The Texas Supreme Court's decision in City Products Corp. v. Ber-
man170 presents a more difficult ambiguity in the standing of the spouses.
In Berman two wives owned an interest in realty as their separate property.
In 1958, when joinder of husbands was required for the consummation of
valid transfers of their wives' separate property, the wives, along with their
husbands and some other owners, entered into a lease of the realty in
which the spouses and the other owners were identified as "landlords" and
164. Prior to its approval, an opponent of the amendment pointed out that the new lan-
guage might be so construed. Johansen, Against Amendment No. 9, 43 TEX. B.J. 925, 926-27
(1980).
165. S.B. 922, 67th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1981).
166. See Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1974). On the evidentiary effect of the
signing of the signature card creating an ostensible joint tenancy account, see Alexander v.
Bowens, 595 S.W.2d 176, 178-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
167. Griffin v. Robertson, 592 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
168. 592 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
169. Id at 63.
170. 610 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1980), rev'g 579 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979).
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as the members of a particular partnership. They were also identified as
such in three subsequent renewals of the agreement. These agreements
contained stipulations that the landlords would not lease any other prop-
erty within 1,000 feet of the premises for use as a variety store. One of the
partners later leased a commercial building within the prohibited zone for
use as a variety store, and suit was brought by the original lessees for viola-
tion of the convenant. As one of the defenses in this suit, the lessors-land-
lords asserted that the original lease to the plaintiffs was in fact void as in
violation of the Texas antitrust statute, in that nonowners (the husbands)
had participated in the lease, and that it therefore constituted a noncompe-
tition covenant in restraint of trade. For purposes of marital property law
the narrow issue was whether the two husbands in question participated in
the transaction as owners or merely as partners.' 17 The supreme court
concluded that the two husbands were acting only as partners-lessors. 172
Because they acted in no other capacity, the court reasoned that there was
no conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust statute. 173
Solely Managed Community Property. In Cumming v. Johnson ' 74 a Ninth
Circuit decision, a Texas husband resisted the enforcement of a contract to
transfer community shares of a corporation on the ground that his wife
had not joined him in the execution of the agreement to transfer. The
shares in question were held in the husband's name only. The plaintiff,
therefore, argued that under section 5.24 of the Texas Family Code 75 the
property was presumed to be subject to the sole management, control, and
disposition of the husband, and that the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the
husband's authority to deal with the property. The husband, however, ar-
gued that the plaintiff was not so entitled because the plaintiff had actual
or constructive notice of the husband's lack of authority. The husband's
argument was based on the fact that the plaintiff was chief executive officer
of the company whose shares were involved. Moreover, the plaintiff had
served on an executive committee that sent both the husband and wife two
letters promising them defense and indemnification in their existing litiga-
tion against the corporation. The thrust of the latter argument was that
dealings with the wife in relation to the shares would not have been en-
gaged in had it not been thought that the wife had an interest in the shares.
The court stated that the rule in Texas is that statutes concerning notice
should be construed most liberally in favor of the party who is affected by
the notice.' 76 The court therefore rejected the husband's argument that the
plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the husband's sole authority under sec-
171. The court of civil appeals determined that the two husbands had no ownership in-
terest in the property and that the purported partnership was nonexistent. 579 S.W.2d at
318.
172. 610 S.W.2d at 449-50.
173. Id
174. 616 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1979).
175. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.24 (Vernon 1975).
176. 616 F.2d at 1075 (citing Phinney v. Langdeau, 337 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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tion 5.24(a) of the Family Code. 17 7 The court distinguished Williams v.
Portland State Bank 178 as a case of actual notice and stated that the plain-
tiff's knowledge in the instant case was not of the same magnitude as that
in Williams.179 In Cumming the court further held that the wife's commu-
nity interest in the shares in question did not preclude an order of specific
performance against the husband for their transfer.180 The court noted,
however, that if the wife had wished to assert that the shares were subject
to joint spousal control rather than sole control of the husband, she could
have petitioned to intervene in the action.' 8 '
Liability. Liability of community property for a spouse's obligation not
arising from the commission of a tort falls on the property subject to that
spouse's sole or joint management. 8 2 In In re Bathrick 8 3 the husband's
trustee in bankruptcy, on behalf of his unsecured creditors, successfully
asserted a claim for conversion of property against the Internal Revenue
Service. The husband and wife had filed a joint tax return and were enti-
tled to a refund. All but a trivial amount of the income had been earned
by the husband. The refund would, therefore, have been subject to his sole
management if the amount attributable to the wife's earnings were ignored
or otherwise subject to his joint management. In either case the refund
should have been available to satisfy his debts. The trustee, therefore, as-
serted a claim against the IRS for the refund. The IRS, nonetheless, pro-
ceeded to issue checks to each spouse for half the amount of the refund.
The bankruptcy court held the IRS liable for conversion in the amount of
the check issued to the wife.' 84
Section 5.22(c) of the Family Code 85 provides that spouses may by oral
agreement allocate the management of particular community property in
one spouse or the other when the property would otherwise be subject to
their joint management. In LeBlanc v. Waller 1 86 the husband's creditor
intervened in a divorce proceeding to reach certain assets that under an
oral separation agreement were subject to the sole control of the wife.
Prior to the agreement the assets had been subject to joint control or to the
sole control of the husband. There was no indication that this agreement
was entered into with an intent to defraud the creditor. In fact, the hus-
177. 616 F.2d at 1075-76.
178. 514 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ dism'd by agr.) (bank's prior
attempt to obtain wife's signature on note showed actual notice of wife's interest in prop-
erty).
179. 616 F.2d at 1076 n.10.
180. Id. at 1076.
181. Id at n. 11. See also Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974) (wife
sought to rescind purchase consummated with funds subject to the joint management of the
spouses). Cooper invites an innovative use of remand to give the wife an opportunity to
intervene. If she fails to do so, the judgment should become final.
182. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1975).
183. 1 B.R. 428 (Bankr. Ct. S.D. Tex. 1979).
184. Id at 433.
185. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(c) (Vernon 1975).
186. 603 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
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band was not a debtor of the creditor at the time the agreement was en-
tered into. The court rejected the creditor's claim and held that the
agreement of the spouses was sufficiently within section 5.22 to insulate the
property from the creditor's claim. 187
LeBlanc thus illustrates a basic inconsistency in the Texas scheme of
management and liability of community property that is at least partially
cured by the recent constitutional amendment. 88 The court in Stewart
Title Co. v. Huddleston 189 succinctly stated the old principles of liability as
they stood before the November 1980 amendment of the constitution: 190
property subject to a creditor's claim was not affected by a partition of
community property and thus was not affected by a decree of divorce that
awarded property to the other spouse.' 9' Under the constitution as it stood
before the amendment, an interspousal partition was specifically made
subject to the preexisting claims of creditors, although a gift of property
from one spouse to the other without an intention to defraud creditors
would have cut off the creditor's claim. 192 Moreover, prior to the amend-
ment, the spouses might, by an oral agreement as to management, preclude
a creditor's recovery when a partition in writing would not have had that
effect. 193
As amended, the constitution no longer allows an existing creditor to
reach partitioned property unless it was partitioned with the intent to de-
fraud the creditor.' 94 The amendment, however, does not specifically
cover divorce decrees that have the effect of partitioning the property. In
such instances, therefore, the property should be partitioned under section
5.42 of the Family Code 195 so that property partitioned in favor of a
nondebtor spouse will not be subject to liabilities incurred by the other
spouse. 196 Such an approach should suffice provided that neither spouse
intends to defraud creditors of the debtor-spouse and that the debtor-
spouse is not made insolvent as a result of the partition.
Several cases decided prior to the constitutional amendment illustrate
the objective of this approach. In Inwood National Bank v. Hoppe 197 the
187. Id at 268.
188. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; note 59 supra; McKnight, Management, Control and
Liability of Marital Property, in TEXAS FAMILY LAW AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 159, 180-
82 (J. McKnight ed. 1975).
189. 598 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 608
S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980).
190. The effective date of the amendment is subject to some doubt. Some authorities
contend that it is effective as of the canvas of the election and proclamation by the Gover-
nor. See, e.g., Texas Water & Gas Co. v. Cleburne, 21 S.W. 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892, no
writ). Other authorities support the proposition that the proclamation makes the amend-
ment retroactive to the date of the election. See, e.g., Christian v. Howeth, 522 S.W.2d 700
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
191. 598 S.W.2d at 323.
192. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 (Vernon 1968).
193. See notes 185-87 supra and accompanying text.
194. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; note 59 supra.
195. TEX. FAM. CODE Ann. § 5.42 (Vernon 1975).
196. See McKnight & Davis, supra note 59, at 923.
197. 596 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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court concluded that a former husband's discharge in bankruptcy did not
have the effect of releasing property awarded to the wife in a divorce de-
cree from liability incurred by the husband. 198 Hoppe rested on the incor-
rect assumption that the wife was personally bound on the husband's
obligation to which she was not a party. 199 This assertion is sometimes
identified as the "community debt" argument. This reasoning, however, is
contrary to the management and liability concepts on which the Family
Code is based. In Hoppe, for instance, the husband's discharge in bank-
ruptcy would have had the effect of discharging any community debt that
he might have incurred unilaterally.
Another situation involving the assumed applicability of the community
debt argument is found in Steed v. Bost.200 During the marriage a creditor
obtained a judgment against the husband. After the spouses' divorce the
husband's judgment creditor brought suit against the ex-wife to subject
property awarded to her in the divorce decree to the judgment debt against
the husband. Subsequently, the ex-husband filed a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy. The husband's trustee in bankruptcy then intervened in the
suit brought by the creditor against the ex-wife. The division of property
in the divorce decree had been made pursuant to a property settlement
agreement between the spouses. The jury, however, found that this agree-
ment was made with an intent on the part of the husband to defraud his
creditors. The trial court set the transfer aside, but did not order the prop-
erty sold or delivered to the trustee; nor did it render a personal judgment
against the wife, as prayed. 20' The trustee's appeal was directed to the
court's failure to render a personal judgment against the wife. The appel-
late court assumed for purposes of the appeal that the trustee had either a
right to a personal judgment against the ex-wife to the extent of the value
of the property she had received, or a right to have the transfer to her set
aside. 202 The court held that the trustee was not entitled to both types of
relief.20 3 Because the trial court had set aside the transfers to the ex-wife,
the court ruled that the trustee would be able to reach the property with a
writ of execution.2°4 Because the trustee had not offered any evidence as
to the value of the property received by the ex-wife, however, the court
stated that a personal judgment for the value of the property received
could not have been rendered even if the trustee had chosen to pursue that
remedy. 205
198. Id at 185.
199. See Swinford v. Allied Fin. Co., 424 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, writ
dism'd), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968). In Swinford both spouses were parties to the
obligation sought to be enforced. The husband's trustee in bankruptcy had waived its inter-
est in the security. Swinford, therefore, does not support the conclusion reached in Hoppe.
200. 602 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
201. Id at 387.
202. Id at 388.
203. Id
204. Id
205. Id at 388-89.
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Under the constitution as it now stands, 206 property received by a wife
under a separation agreement that was partitioned to her with intent to
defraud the husband's creditors is not insulated from creditors' claims to
which it might have been subjected during marriage. In attempting to
reach the property, however, the creditor must make his choice of remedies
between having the transfer set aside or taking a personal money judgment
against the ex-wife for the value of the property received by her at the time
of its receipt.
In Miller v. City National Bank,207 a recent pre-amendment case, the
court apparently overlooked the then prevailing law with respect to liabil-
ity of property after divorce that might have been reached by a creditor
prior to the divorce. During the marriage the husband alone executed
notes to the plaintiff-bank. After the divorce the bank sued the wife for the
amount owed on the note by the ex-husband, alleging that certain commu-
nity property was divided in favor of the wife in the divorce decree. The
bank did not seek to set aside the award of property to the wife by the
divorce court, but merely sought a judgment against her for the amount of
the note. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court and
held that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the notes
were the liabilities of the wife jointly with her husband who incurred the
debts. 20 8 This result will be reached under present law when a partition is
made between the spouses without an intent to defraud creditors.
Effects of a Spouse's Death. A surviving spouse is empowered by statute 209
to sell any community assets for the payment of community liabilities.
Whether the property dealt with was subject to the sole management of the
decedent or the survivor, or was subject to their joint management during
marriage, is immaterial.210 Nor does it matter whether the property is sold
in the name of the survivor individually or as survivor.211 In the case of a
conveyance of community realty in this context, also immaterial is the fact
that personalty has not been exhuasted before the realty was sold.212 In
light of these principles, some anomalous results may arise on the denial of
a claim presented against the estate of a deceased spouse.
In Albiar v. Arguello21 3 a claim against the estate of the deceased spouse
was presented to the decedent's administrator, whose inaction was alleged
to constitute a rejection of the claim. Because the creditor failed to file suit
against the administrator within the prescribed ninety days, 214 the court
ruled that suit against the administrator was barred thereafter.215 Because
206. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; see note 59 supra.
207. 594 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
208. Id at 826.
209. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 160 (Vernon 1980). See also id § 168.
210. See Horton v. Harris, No. 1382, slip op. at 7 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler Dec. 18, 1980).
211. Id, slip op. at 7.
212. Id, slip op. at 7-8.
213. 612 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).
214. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 313 (Vernon 1980).
215. 612 S.W.2d at 220.
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the claim was based on a note signed by the decedent and the surviving
spouse, the creditor's suit against the survivor in his individual capacity
was valid. The court, however, concluded that it was valid only against the
survivor's half of the community estate.216 This result followed because
the decedent's half had passed to the decedent's heirs and was not the sur-
vivor's property. The curious result is with respect to the survivor's liabil-
ity. If the debtor had sued the survivor alone as a maker of the joint note
during the marriage, the creditor would have been allowed to recover from
the maker the entire amount of the note and would have been able to
satisfy the claim out of any community property subject to the sole or joint
management of the survivor-spouse. Although community property sub-
ject to the sole or joint control of the deceased spouse passes to that
spouse's personal representative and is subject to payment of any debts
owed by the decedent, a reciprocal effect is not had with respect to the
decedent's interest in property subject to the sole control of the surviving
spouse.217
Homestead- Designation and Extent. Once property is established as the
homestead 2' 8 of a debtor by his use of it as such, the burden is upon the
creditor who attempts to seize it to show the contrary. 219 The debtor who
has given a mortgage on property asserted to be his homestead may, never-
theless, bear a certain burden of persuasion when he moves to set aside a
foreclosure of the mortgage to show that the property was his homestead
when the mortgage was given.220 Having alleged the homestead character
of the property and offered proof to sustain it, the debtor's position is se-
cure unless the creditor can show the contrary. The fact that the property
may have since lost its homestead character is irrelevant. The rule is
otherwise, however, with respect to the sale of the homestead by one
spouse without the joinder of the other. In that instance, the sale is merely
inoperative so long as the homestead character of the property contin-
ues.221 If the homestead is abandoned, the transfer is valid.222 If both
spouses join in the contract for the sale of the homestead, which is not a
mere option to a purchaser to contract at some later date, both spouses are
bound, and the contract is specifically enforceable by the purchaser.
223
The distinction between a contract of sale and an option may be shown by
the fact that the transaction is designated as a contract of sale in the instru-
ment of agreement, which uses language of sale throughout; on the other
216. Id.
217. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 177(b) (Vernon 1980).
218. See Cauble v. Gray, 604 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
219. Chalk v. Daggett, 257 S.W. 228, 232 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, judgmt adopted).
See also Hargadine v. Whitfield, 71 Tex. 482, 491, 9 S.W. 475, 478-79 (1888) (creditor has
burden to establish abandonment of homestead).
220. Braden Steel Corp. v. McClure, 603 S.W.2d 288, 291-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1980, no writ).
221. Grissom v. Anderson, 125 Tex. 26, 30, 79 S.W.2d 619, 621 (1935).
222. Kunkel v. Kunkel, 515 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ refd
n.r.e.).
223. Donahoe v. Allen, 608 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
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hand, a provision that the vendor must accept a sum as a forfeit for default
on the part of the buyer indicates an option rather than a sale. 224
In the case of a transfer as opposed to a mortgage, if one spouse fails to
join in the transaction, the death of that spouse causes the conveyance by
the other spouse by sale or gift to become perfected. 225 In the case of an
attempted mortgage of a homestead, waiver of homestead protection is in-
effective in the absence of designation of other property that might be
claimed as the homestead, but the spouses may achieve the same objective
by making a conveyance of the homestead to a corporation that they con-
trol and then allowing the corporation to mortgage the property.226
The duration of the homestead extends for the lives of both of the
spouses, though both may dispose of the property during their joint lives
and the survivor (if the owner) may dispose of the property as he or she
wishes. 227 A nice distinction may be drawn between the power of the sur-
viving spouse to mortgage the family homestead and that of the person
who holds a homestead merely as a single adult. In the latter case, the
single person seems to be precluded by the constitution from making a
valid mortgage on the property,228 whereas earlier case law (before a
homestead was provided for an adult single person) allowed a surviving
spouse to mortgage the homestead. 229 The surviving spouse, however,
cannot sell the separate homestead of a deceased spouse in the face of
opposition by the decedent's heir or a devisee of the property.230 The
rights of the heir or devisee, nonetheless, may be postponed substantially if
the surviving spouse owns an interest in the property subject to homestead
occupancy and the surviving spouse remarries and dies leaving a surviving
spouse.23' In this instance the surviving spouse of the second marriage is
entitled to homestead rights in the ownership interest in the property held
by the surviving spouse of the first marriage. 232 If, however, the first sur-
viving spouse had no ownership interest in the property, the second surviv-
224. Id at 747.
225. Id. at 748. But see Tolman v. Overstreet, 590 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, no writ).
226. Eckard v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 588 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
227. See Comment, Termination of the Texas Homestead-A Summary, 10 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1019, 1020-30 (1979).
228. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
229. See Lacy v. Rollins, 74 Tex. 566, 12 S.W. 314 (1889). Following a divorce, the
nature of a homestead as a family homestead or that of a single adult depends on the condi-
tion of the family unit dissolved. If there were children of the marriage, even though no
longer minor children, the homestead is a family homestead. If there were no children, the
interest of the homestead claimant is that of a single adult. In this latter instance the family
homestead terminates on divorce. Day v. Day, 610 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The single-adult homestead of the remaining family constituent is a
new rather than a continuing homestead.
230. Franklin v. Woods, 598 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, no
writ).
231. Gentry v. Marburger, 596 S.W.2d 201, 203-04 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
232. Id (citing 28 TEX. JUR. 2D Homesteads § 193, at 618 (1961)).
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ing spouse cannot assert a homestead claim.233 Recently it has been
asserted that the surviving spouse, guilty of wrongfully killing the deceased
spouse, forfeits the homestead right in property owned in whole or in part
by the decedent. 234 The instance in which the point was argued, however,
turned upon the validity of a temporary injunction of occupancy by the
surviving spouse, and, therefore, was inconclusive.
235
Texas, unlike several other states, 236 has not treated its increases in the
homestead exemption as having a retroactive effect.237 The result is that
the increase of the homestead exemption from $5,000 to $10,000 does not
affect a homestead already acquired or liens already in existence. If the
bankrupt's homestead must be sold in order to realize the value of the
nonexempt portion for secured and unsecured creditors, the proceeds from
the nonexempt portion should first be applied to a first mortgage lien on
the property to the extent that it is in excess of the purchase-money mort-
gage.238 The bankrupt has the equitable right to force the lienholder to
take his share out of the nonexempt portion first, even though the effect is
to reduce the amount of assets against which the general creditor might
have a claim.239
Federal law impinges upon the homestead exemption in several signifi-
cant ways. First, the federal tax lien prevails over the homestead right
provided by state law.24° Secondly, the Tax Reform Act of 1978 creates
what has been referred to as "marriage tax." If two taxpayers each own a
residence and marry before selling their residences, they are entitled to
only one exclusion, in that the law provides only one lifetime exclusion for
a married couple; each spouse does not have a separate exclusion.
24
'
Thus, under the Act, the marriage of a person over fifty-five causes that
person to lose the $100,000 tax-free exclusion of gain from the sale of a
principal residence. 242 If, however, either spouse sells his or her home
before marriage, the seller is entitled to the $100,000 exclusion. 243 Finally,
the federal Bankruptcy Act may have some bearing on the handling of the
homestead exemption of the bankrupt debtor.
244
233. Marino v. Lombardo, 277 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1955, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
234. Philen v. Sorensen, 609 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
235. Id. at 657.
236. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 486 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. La. 1980). But see In re
Bassin, 637 F. Supp. 668 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Echavarren, 2 B.R. 215 (Bankr. Ct. D. Idaho
1980).
237. Valley Bank v. Skeen, 401 F. Supp. 139, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1975); In re Bobbitt, 3 B.R.
372, 373 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
238. In re Bobbitt, 3 B.R. 372, 373 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
239. Id
240. United States v. Wilson, 500 F. Supp. 831, 833 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
241. See I.R.C. § 1034.
242. See id
243. Id
244. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. III 1979). For federal exemption of certain federally
created pension rights, see General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980);
Fisher, New Bankruptcy Exemption Law.- What It Means or Texans, 44 TEX. B.J. 145, 149
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Exempt Personally. The Bankruptcy Act provides that couples and others
jointly liable may file their petition in bankruptcy together as "joint debt-
ors" in a single proceeding, subject to a single filing fee. 245 A bankruptcy
court in the Northern District of Texas recently considered whether a hus-
band and wife, proceeding as "joint debtors," might each claim a different
exemption: the state exemption for one and federal exemption for the
other.246 The court concluded that in such a bankruptcy proceeding only
one of the personal property exemptions may be claimed by both spouses,
because the state exemption is claimed as a "family exemption" under
state law, and there is no room to claim any other exemptions.247 The
question was whether the wife could claim the federal exemption under
the Act after the husband had chosen to claim state exemptions. The mere
fact that the wife cannot claim any state exemption should not bar her
from claiming the federal exemption in her own bankruptcy. Conceding
for the purpose of argument that the state merely allows a family exemp-
tion, it does not necessarily follow that a member of that family who would
not be entitled to a state exemption is precluded from claiming the federal
exemption under the federal Act.
In In re Bardwe1248 a creditor sought to prevent both spouses' discharge
in bankruptcy, asserting that a knowingly false financial statement was
given by them in obtaining a loan from the creditor. The bankruptcy court
dismissed the creditor's objection to the wife's discharge, and the creditor
appealed.249 The Fifth Circuit held that the wife, who believed that the
financial statement was true and did not act with such reckless indifference
to the facts as to warrant the finding that she had acted fraudulently, was
not precluded from claiming a discharge.250
In every instance when husbands and wives are jointly liable, however,
both may not be before the bankruptcy court as "joint debtors."' 251 In the
recent case of In re Jeffery252 the bankruptcy court held that when the
husband's liability on a joint obligation with his wife was sought to be
discharged in bankruptcy, and a particular country club membership cer-
tificate evidencing whole-ownership of the interest in the husband and
wife vested in the trustee in bankruptcy, the wife, who was neither a party
to the turnover action nor the bankruptcy, could not be compelled to turn
over and endorse the certificate to the trustee.2 53
(1981); Comment, The New Bankruptcy Law: A Comparison of Texas and Federal Exemp-
tions, 17 Hous. L. REV. 373 (1980).
245. 11 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. III 1979).
246. In re Cannady, BK 5-79-00090 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 1980).
247. Id, slip op. at 11. The court stated: "In this case the schedules indicate that the
husband is claiming the Texas family exemptions in personal property valued at more than
$20,000. By so claiming the family exemption he has effectively prevented the wife, a mem-
ber of that family, from claiming additional exemptions." Id
248. 610 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1980).
249. Id at 229.
250. Id at 230.
251. Id
252. 2 B.R. 197 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
253. Id at 199.
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It should be noted briefly that landlords' liens with respect to personalty
have been revised recently.254 Because these liens commonly have such a
large bearing on family welfare, their applicability should not be over-
looked.
IV. DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction and Venue. In divorce cases, challenges to the court's jurisdic-
tion rarely concern the court's power to grant the divorce or to make a
division of property; instead, most jurisdictional attacks are directed at the
court's ability to affect the parent-child relationship. 255 In In re Allen256
both jurisdictional issues were before the court. A wife filed a conservator-
ship matter in county A. Subsequently, the husband filed for divorce as
well as conservatorship in county B and made a motion to transfer the
conservatorship proceeding from the court in county A to that in county B.
The wife thereupon countered by amending her petition in county A to
include a prayer for divorce. Citing Cleveland v. Ward257 the appellate
court held that the court in county B had acquired dominant jurisdiction
of the entire controversy because the divorce suit had been filed there
first.258 The court also concluded that under section 3.55(c) of the Family
Code259 the husband's motion to transfer the parent-child relationship case
created a mandatory duty on the part of the court in county A to transfer
the matter to the court in county B. 260 Thus, the wife's amendment of her
earlier petition to embrace a suit for divorce was to no avail because it was
filed after the court in county B had acquired dominant jurisdiction of the
divorce case. The A//en case is of further relevance because the wife, at the
time of the suit, had not yet been a resident of county A long enough to file
a petition for divorce. The appellate court specifically stated that, al-
though there is some authority suggesting that a petitioner may file a peti-
tion for divorce without meeting durational county residence
requirements, 26' such a premature filing cannot divest a court of dominant
jurisdiction of its power to hear a case already on file. 262 Along similar
254. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
255. See Solender, Family Law.- Parent and Child, infra at 156. For an example of this
phenomenon, see Cossey v. Cossey, 602 S.W.2d 591, 593-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980,
no writ), in which the court refused to exercise its jurisdiction over a parent-child matter
because the children resided in Louisiana and the divorce would not be contested at trial.
256. 593 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ). For a case in which a
Texas court assumed jurisdiction over a divorce and the accompanying parent-child matter
even though successive petitions were filed in both Texas and a sister state, see Felch v.
Felch, 605 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
257. 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063 (1926). See also Brown v. Brown, 566 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.
Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
258. 593 S.W.2d at 137. See also Johnson v. Avery, 414 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. 1966); V.D.
Anderson Co. v. Young, 128 Tex. 631, 101 S.W.2d 798 (1937); In re Parr, 543 S.W.2d 433
(Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
259. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.55(c) (Vernon 1975).
260. 593 S.W.2d at 137.
261. See, e.g., Beavers v. Beavers, 545 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ);
Shankles v. Shankles, 445 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969, no writ).
262. 593 S.W.2d at 137 n.4.
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lines, another court263 concluded that the duration of one's residence in a
county is not broken by a mere temporary absence from the county. 264
McCombs v. Forney265 presented a nice point concerning a plea of privi-
lege. A wife joined a third-party defendant in her cross-claim for divorce.
The third party filed a plea of privilege to which the wife failed to file a
timely controverting affidavit. The third party was, therefore, entitled to
have the cause of action, as it applied to him, transferred to the county
named in his plea. At that point, however, the spouses reached a settle-
ment in their divorce suit, and the action by the wife against the third party
was dismissed with prejudice and without notice. Subsequently, the wife
filed a bill of review alleging, inter alia, that the former husband had se-
creted community assets and, therefore, that the settlement reached during
the divorce proceeding was void. The third party was once again joined
and he once again filed a plea of privilege. This time, the wife filed a
timely controverting affidavit. In determining whether the plea should be
sustained, the court stated:
In this case, which is a case of first impression, it would seem that
equity would require that the issues be tried separately. If the judg-
ment is not vacated as to the underlying cause of action against [the
third party], then there would be no need to consider transferring the
cause of action against [him]. If the judgment is vacated, then his plea
of privilege should be sustained because venue as to the underlying
cause of action was settled in the prior proceeding. This is so because
when [the wife] dismissed her cause in the prior suit after having
failed to timely file her controverting affidavit she abandoned her con-
test of the plea of privilege and made an admission that the plea was
well taken . . . . However, should the trial judge, after hearing on a
written motion, find that good cause existed for the late filing of the
controverting plea. . . then [the third party's] plea of privilege should
be heard and ruled on by the trial court.266
Two cases dealt with the related matters of disqualification of an attor-
ney and recusal of the judge because of an alleged prohibited family rela-
tionship with the attorney. In Loll v. Lo/t 267 the husband asserted that the
wife's attorney should be disqualified from appearing on behalf of his cli-
ent because he had been representing both the husband and the wife in a
proceeding against a third person for personal injuries to the wife. When
the wife employed him to sue her husband for divorce, the attorney noti-
fied the husband that he could no longer represent him in the suit against
the third person. The husband later intervened in that suit, which was
brought by the attorney on behalf of the wife only. In the divorce proceed-
ing, the court awarded the wife the proceeds of her claim in the third-party
suit; the husband also was awarded the amount of his claim. In attempting
263. Lott v. Lott, 605 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ dism'd).
264. Id at 668.
265. 607 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).
266. Id at 592.
267. 605 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ dism'd).
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to show the impropriety of the attorney's representing the wife against him
in the divorce proceeding, the husband argued that the suits for personal
injury and divorce were interrelated and that the wife had changed her
pleadings in the personal injury proceeding from a claim for treble dam-
ages under the deceptive trade practices act, which would have produced
community property, to a claim for negligence, which would have consti-
tuted separate property under the circumstances. The court rejected the
husband's contention, stating: "While there may be the appearance of im-
propriety here, it is not sufficient to warrant the disqualification of the at-
torney." 268
In Martinez v. Martine 269 the husband sought to have the judge recuse
himself because his wife's attorney was the judge's son-in-law and was, in
a sense, a party because attorney's fees could be awarded in the proceed-
ing. The court rejected the husband's contention, basing its conclusion on
two substantive grounds of precedent:270 article V, section 11 of the Texas
Constitution 271 and statutory article 15.272 When read together, these au-
thorities provide that a judge shall not sit in any case in which any party is
related to him by affinity within the third degree.273 Although the wife did
not specifically seek attorney's fees, and no attorney's fees were awarded,
the husband's strongest argument was that the judge could have awarded
attorney's fees and, therefore, might unjustly favor his relative's client in
making the property division. Whether he could have granted attorney's
fees would have depended on the nature of the relief sought; the court,
however, did not discuss the issue. Instead, it distinguished workers' com-
pensation cases, 2 74 stating that the judge must be disqualified in such cases
because he is required to approve attorney's fees.275 The court also
pointed out that an attorney with a contingent fee contract is not directly
interested in the subject matter of a lawsuit and, therefore, is not a party
within the meaning of the statute276 disqualifying a judge who is related to
him unless the judge must approve the fee. 277 The court's conclusion,
therefore, seems well within the existing precedents, but if the impropriety
of the judge's sitting in such cases is as strong as it would seem to be, a
provision could be added to the Family Code to prohibit such an abuse in
accordance with the constitutional provision. 278
268. Id at 668.
269. 608 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
270. Id. at 720-21.
271. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
272. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 15 (Vernon 1959).
273. Id; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1I.
274. See, e.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. McGee, 163 Tex. 412, 356 S.W.2d 666
(1962); Postal Mutual Indem. Co. v. Ellis, 140 Tex. 570, 169 S.W.2d 482 (1943).
275. 608 S.W.2d at 720.
276. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 15 (Vernon 1959); see text accompanying notes 270-
73 supra.
277. 608 S.W.2d at 721 (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Benton, 163 Tex. 477, 357 S.W.2d 565
(1962)).
278. The recent amendment of TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a may, however, adequately deal with
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Robertson v. Robertson279 is a very peculiar case. In 1978 a wife sued
her husband for divorce. In the decree granting the divorce, each of the
daughters of the parties, who were adults at the time, were granted money
judgments against the husband, though neither daughter was a party to the
proceeding. The judgment rendered in favor of the daughters was to have
been paid in annual installments. In the present action the daughters
brought suit against their father to foreclose a lien on property securing the
payment of the money judgments. In reversing the trial court's judgment
foreclosing the lien, the appellate court held that the prior divorce decree
insofar as it granted relief to the daughters was void on its face because
they were not parties. 280 The court went on to observe that even if the
divorce judgment were not void as to the daughters, they could not main-
tain a suit for the whole amount owed to them because there was no provi-
sion in the decree authorizing acceleration in the event of default, nor was
there an allegation in their petition of anticipatory repudiation.28'
Continuance. A point of error taken with respect to a denial of a motion
for continuance cannot be expected to be treated very seriously by the ap-
pellate court unless the motion itself was made in compliance with the
prescribed rules.282 If an affidavit of certain facts is required but not of-
fered to support the motion, an appeal from the denial of the motion will
not succeed.283 One court stated:
If the ground of the motion is the want of testimony, the party apply-
ing for it must show, among other things, that the absent testimony is
material, showing the materiality thereof, and if the continuance is
because of the absence of a material witness (party), what is expected
to be proved by such testimony.284
Even in the event of compliance with the rules, the decision to grant or
deny the motion lies within the discretion of the trial judge, and the judge's
order will not be disturbed without a showing of an abuse of discretion. 285
Amendment of Pleading. Leave of the judge must be obtained in order to
amend a pleading by adding new substantive matters within seven days of
trial.286 Leave to amend will be granted "unless there is a showing that
the point. See Pope & McConnico, Practicing Law with the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L.
REV. 456, 490-91 (1980).
279. 608 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).
280. Id at 247.
281. Id. For instances in which the principle of anticipatory breach has been applied in
child support cases, see McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67,
107-08 (1975).
282. TEX. R. Civ. P. 251, 252.
283. See Felch v. Felch, 605 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd);
Brown v. Brown, 599 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ). See also
Frick v. Frick, 587 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ dism'd).
284. Brown v. Brown, 599 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no
writ).
285. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Heldenfels, 374 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1963).
286. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63.
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such amendment will operate as a surprise to the opposite party. '287 If the
judge refuses to allow amendment, however, the burden of showing an
abuse of his discretion is on the complaining party; there is no burden on
the opposing party at that point to show surprise.288
Jury Trial. In Jones v.. Jones289 the Beaumont court of civil appeals held
that it is reversible error for a court to fail to empanel a jury in a divorce
proceeding when one is timely demanded and there are factual issues that
are in dispute.290 Denial of a jury is harmless error only if the facts are
undisputed. If there is a disputed fact and a jury trial is requested by ei-
ther party, it should be granted as a matter of course. 29' In Young v.
Young, 292 however, the Austin court of civil appeals took a somewhat dif-
ferent approach. In November the case was set for trial on the nonjury
docket for February 20. A demand for a jury trial was made and the jury
fee paid on February 6. At the hearing on February 20 the court adminis-
trator testified that the earliest possible setting for a jury trial would be the
following August. The trial court's conclusion, sustained by the appellate
court, was that rule 216293 requires that a "demand for a jury be made and
the fee paid 'on or before appearance day or, if thereafter, a reasonable
time before the date set for trial of the cause in the non-jury docket, but
not less than ten days in advance.' "294 Thus, in this instance, the demand
for jury trial was not made within a reasonable time and, therefore, the
moving party was not entitled to a jury trial even though the motion was
made fourteen days before the matter was set for trial.295
In another case 296 the appellate court approved the separation of issues
for submission to the jury. This was a case of two successive divorces be-
tween the same parties. In the second divorce the court also had before it a
bill of review with respect to the first divorce. In order to save time, the
trial court heard evidence on the bill of review and submitted those issues
to the jury297 before hearing evidence on the second divorce, after which,
other issues were submitted to the jury. Although rule 270298 provides that
"no evidence on a controversial matter shall be received after the verdict
of the jury," that rule was not violated here because "no evidence on the
bill of review issues was received after the jury verdict on those issues." 299
287. Id.
288. Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 349-50 (Tex. 1980).
289. 592 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
290. Id at 20. See also Jerrell v. Jerrell, 402 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1966, no writ).
291. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; id art. V, § 10; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.61 (Vernon
Supp. 1980-1981).
292. 589 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ dism'd).
293. TEX. R. Civ. P. 216.
294. 589 S.W.2d at 521 (emphasis by court) (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 216).
295. Id at 521.
296. Humphrey v. Humphrey, 593 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, writ dism'd).
297. TEX. R. Civ. P. 174(b).
298. TEX. R. Civ. P. 270.
299. 593 S.W.2d at 825.
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Masters and Receivers. Two issues are paramount with respect to masters:
first, whether in a particular case appointment of a master is appropriate,
and secondly, if appropriate, what effect is to be given to the master's find-
ings. The first of these points was considered in Mann v. Mann.3°° Pursu-
ant to rule 171301 the court appointed a master, co-master, and auditor in a
divorce proceeding to determine the value of the community estate. The
appointments were made because the husband's salvage business was
unique in nature and the court would have had great difficulty in valuing
the community property assets. The Texas Supreme Court pointed out
that the request for a jury trial did not preclude the appointment of a
master as the lower court had, in effect, held. 30 2 In Cameron v. Cameron
30 3
the trial judge referred the property issues in a divorce suit to a master
under authority of rule 171. 304 After hearing the evidence, the master pre-
pared a written report with recommendations as to division of the prop-
erty. Objections were made to the report, but no evidence was offered to
rebut the master's findings. The appellate court concluded that when is-
sues are referred to the master under rule 171, his report is conclusive on
the matters considered by him in the absence of proper objection accompa-
nied by supporting evidence. 30 5 Further, the court stated that in the ab-
sence of an offer to present evidence, the trial court is not required to elicit
evidence in support of the objections. 3°6 The appellate court also ob-
served:
Perhaps the judge, as well as counsel, had the erroneous impression
that the property division was subject to review on appeal on the basis
of sufficiency of the evidence before the master to support his findings
and recommendations and that the objections allowed would provide
a basis for such review. Or, perhaps, the judge anticipated that one of
the parties might complain of lack of opportunity to offer evidence on
the property division. In any event, no objection was made to the
effect that the appellant . . . was denied an opportunity to present
evidence in support of her objections to the master's report before the
report was adopted by the court ....
... She apparently acquiesced in the court's ruling that the
master's findings and recommendations would be adopted, subject to
review on appeal on the basis of the evidence before the master. Since
that remedy is not available to her, she cannot complain on appeal
that the court erred in denying her the right to present evidence in
support of her oral objections, a right she failed to assert in the trial
court.
3 0 7
It is notable, perhaps, that in Cameron the court not only adopted the
master's finding of fact but also his recommendations with respect to the
300. 607 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1980), rep'g 592 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979).
301. TEX. R. Civ. P. 171.
302. 607 S.W.2d at 246.
303. 601 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
304. TEX. R. Civ. P. 171.
305. 601 S.W.2d at 815.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 816.
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property division. In such a situation, if a party is dissatisfied with the
master's recommendations, that party has the responsibility of offering evi-
dence in support of his objections.
In another case 308 the husband contended that the trial court had abused
its discretion in appointing a receiver to make an immediate sale of the
community home. The appellate court noted that in a divorce proceeding
the trial court is not limited by the provisions of article 2293,309 governing
the appointment of a receiver, but also can utilize the appointment powers
granted by the Family Code. 310 Under the circumstances presented in the
case, the husband was unable to show an abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court in appointing a receiver; he owed large debts and there was
a seeming inability on his part to make temporary support payments for
his wife and children, as well as an inability on the part of both spouses to
make payments on the home. In Harrington v. Schuble31' the question in
issue was not the propriety of appointing a receiver, but instead, the issues
addressed were what level of competency must be exercised by a receiver
in discharging his responsibilities in selling the family home and what is
the proper role of the courts in supervising a receiver's acts. In almost
every respect matters seem to have been ineptly handled. The court of-
fered some useful suggestions with respect to the standard of conduct that
a receiver and a trial court should exercise when dealing with such transac-
tions.312
Evidence of Grounds/or Divorce. Although the situation in Austin v. Aus-
tin313 is certainly atypical, the court's holding is a precedent for the propo-
sition that the parties to a divorce proceeding may stipulate as to what a
petitioner's testimony would be, that such stipulation may be introduced
into evidence, and that it may be considered in determining the grounds
for divorce. 314 The testimony, however, is still subject to being contro-
verted by opposing evidence and its probative value is a question for the
trier of fact.315 The stipulation, therefore, is not an admission of the facts
testified to by the absent witness-party. In this particular case, the other
party was present and, therefore, the supreme court did not address the
issue of whether it would be permissible for both parties to stipulate to
their prospective testimony. Nothing was said by the court, however, that
would preclude the granting of the divorce if both parties were absent and
presented their evidence by stipulation. Thus, the way seems to be open in
308. Sparr v. Sparr, 596 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
309. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2293 (Vernon 1971).
310. 596 S.W.2d at 165.
311. 608 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
312. Id at 256-57.
313. 603 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. 1980). In In re Glaze, 605 S.W.2d 721, 725-26 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ), the court relied on Austin in giving effect to testimony
"phrased largely in ultimate terms," as in Austin, with respect to the ground for divorce.
314. 603 S.W.2d at 206-07.
315. Id at 207.
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proper cases of hardship for a divorce to be granted on the stipulation of
the parties without an appearance by either of them.
Cervantes v. Cervantes316 also enunciates a precedent that is at variance
with old ways of doing things. In this case, the wife filed for divorce alleg-
ing the ground of insupportability under section 3.01 of the Family
Code.317 The husband contended that the evidence was insufficient to es-
tablish the ground asserted by his wife because the parties had lived to-
gether up to the time of the hearing. The wife's testimony at the trial,
however, was that although the parties lived under the same roof following
her petition for divorce there was no "marital interaction" 318 during that
time. The appellate court ruled that the evidence presented was sufficient
to support a finding of insupportability. 31 9 Although this is not a case of
continued cohabitation until the granting of the divorce, it is, nonetheless,
authority for the proposition that parties may continue to live under the
same roof without necessarily jeopardizing a cause of action for insup-
portability, provided that normal marital cohabitation has ceased.
Other Evidentiary Issues. In Crisp v. Security National Insurance Co. 320 the
Texas Supreme Court stated that in determining the value of insured
household goods destroyed by fire, the value of the goods to their owner
should be the measure of the loss rather than the replacement cost or sec-
ond-hand market value of the items destroyed. 32' In a recent divorce
case322 the court relied on this authority to exclude the testimony of an
expert witness called to appraise the personal property of the parties. 323 In
so ruling, the appellate court emphasized that the expert witness indicated
that he would use standards such as market value in his evaluation:
In Crisp, the [supreme] court stated that actual value must be deter-
mined without resort to market value, but [the witness's] appraisals
were based, in part, upon prices that would be brought at a forced or
distressed sale which is not a relevant criterion in determining either
fair market value or actual value to the owner. Therefore, the court
did not err in excluding his opinion as evidence of either fair market
value or actual value.324
Trick v. Trick325 involved a dispute as to the value of stock in a profes-
sional medical association. The wife sought to introduce the testimony of
a banker as an expert witness as to the value of the stock. The trial court
refused to allow him to testify as an expert; even though the witness had
made loans to many companies, he did not have any experience with re-
316. 591 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
317. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon 1975).
318. 591 S.W.2d at 334.
319. Id.
320. 369 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. 1963).
321. Id at 328-29.
322. Wendlandt v. Wendlandt, 596 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1980, no writ).
323. Id at 325.
324. Id.
325. 587 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ dism'd).
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spect to valuing professional associations. The appellate court affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. 326
Mykiebust v. Myklebust 327 concerned the fraudulent concealment of
community property in a divorce proceeding. The suit was filed after the
divorce proceeding had terminated. The evidentiary point involved in the
case, however, is equally applicable to a divorce proceeding. In prepara-
tion for the divorce hearing, the husband's employer resisted discovery at-
tempts by interposing a motion for protection under rule 186(b), 328 which
the court granted. By the time of this proceeding, the employer seemed to
have answered the interrogatories that the wife's counsel originally had
propounded. The court concluded that the wife had a right to the informa-
tion concerning community benefits earned by the husband and that the
employer had the duty to supply this information.
329
In another case 330 the divorce court denied a post-trial motion to reopen
for admission of additional evidence prior to judgment. The appellate
court held that this denial constituted an abuse of discretion in that the
evidence that was sought to be offered would have shown changed circum-
stances of the parties and damage to their property.
33
'
Finality of Judgment. In In re Johnson332 the point was once more reiter-
ated 333 that the issues of divorce and property division cannot be severed
in a divorce proceeding.334 Hence, until both issues are adjudicated, an
appeal cannot be taken from a part of the cause of action because the
matter is interlocutory in nature. 3
35
Horlock v. Horlock336 involved the issue of when a divorce decree
becomes final for purposes of characterization of property acquired by one
of the parties. After the trial court had entered judgment granting the di-
vorce and dividing the property, the ex-husband acquired title to further
property. The trial court then entered an amended judgment with respect
to the property division. On appeal, this order was further modified. In
approaching the chronology of events, the appellate court first concluded
that the amended judgment of the trial court had the effect of adding
something that was omitted inadvertently, so that the original judgment
was not truly replaced, but merely corrected. 337 The amended judgment,
therefore, related back to the date on which the divorce was orally ren-
dered and the property acquired after judgment constituted an acquisition
326. Id at 773.
327. 605 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
328. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186(b).
329. 605 S.W.2d at 398.
330. Musick v. Musick, 590 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
331. Id at 584-85.
332. 595 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
333. See McKnight, supra note 113, at 142 n.243.
334. 595 S.W.2d at 903.
335. Id at 902-03.
336. 593 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
337. Id. at 745.
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of separate rather than community property. 338
Burrell v. Cornelius339 involved the extent to which a decree of divorce
applies to transactions of the husband with third persons who are not par-
ties to the divorce proceeding. In the suit for divorce the wife alleged that
the husband had fraudulently concealed the proceeds of a sale of the com-
munity homestead shortly before the filing of the divorce petition. In the
decree, the court divided the property, which included the proceeds from
the sale of the home. After the rendition of the decree, the ex-wife initi-
ated a new suit against her former husband and others involved in the sale.
The appellate court held that because the issue of misappropriation of the
homestead proceeds was raised in the divorce proceeding, the husband was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law in that the issue was barred from
being relitigated under the doctrine of res judicata. 340
Motion for a New Trial. Although the period of ten days for filing a mo-
tion for a new trial has been extended to thirty days of the signing of the
judgment,341 some cases decided under the old rule may still have some
relevance. The motion for a new trial was not only tardily filed in Lott v.
Loltt,342 but there was also some uncertainty on the part of the movant as
to the relief that he sought to obtain. At the hearing that was held on the
thirtieth day after the final judgment was rendered, the movant assured the
court repeatedly that he was not asking for a new trial, but instead was
only seeking to have the judgment corrected in certain respects. 343 The
order that was entered after the hearing, however, granted a new trial.
Sometime afterward an amended judgment responding to some of the mo-
vant's requests was also entered. On appeal the appellant-movant urged
that the amended judgment was void because the lower court had failed to
hear any evidence after it had granted a motion for a new trial. The appel-
late court concluded that the appellant was precluded from making such
an assertion because the relief granted was essentially that which he had
sought.34" In so holding, the court stated:
After appellant argued to the trial court that if his motion was granted
a new trial would not be necessary, and obtained a ruling based upon
this assertion, he cannot change his position. A party who takes a
position successfully in a judicial proceeding cannot then take an in-
consistent position, especially if his adversary is thereby prejudiced. 345
Under the old rule the Texas Supreme Court held in McCormack v.
Guilot346 that the granting of a tardy motion for a new trial had to be in
338. See id
339. 588 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
340. Id at 405.
341. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b. See Pope & McConnico, supra note 278, at 496-98.
342. 605 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ dism'd).
343. For the new rule on modification of a judgment, see TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(g)-(h);
Pope & McConnico, supra note 278, at 499-500.
344. 605 S.W.2d at 667.
345. Id
346. 597 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1980).
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writing and signed by the judge within thirty days after the decree is ren-
dered or else it was not effective. 347 Thus, the court concluded that the
mere oral granting of a motion within that period was a nullity even
though oral rendition was followed by a written order beyond the thirty
day period.34 8 Under rule 329b as it now stands, 349 a motion for a new
trial shall be filed within thirty days of the signing of the judgment. If such
a motion has been so filed, the trial court has power to grant a new trial or
to modify the judgment until thirty days after any such motion is over-
ruled.350 If a motion for a new trial is not determined by a written order
signed within seventy-five days after the judgment is signed, it is overruled
by operation of law.351
The determination of whether to grant a motion for a new trial is within
the sound discretion of the trial court. Even if a movant has shown that a
failure to answer or appear was not intentional or the result of conscious
indifference, the movant must still allege facts that would constitute a mer-
itorious defense and show that granting the motion would not occasion
delay or otherwise harm the plaintiff.352
Under new rule 356(a) 353 an appeal must be perfected within thirty days
from the date the judgment is signed if there is no motion for new trial. It
must be perfected within ninety days from the date the judgment is signed
if there is a timely motion for a new trial filed by any party.354 In Garza v.
Garza355 neither party was satisfied with the judgment. The husband filed
a formal motion for a new trial, and the wife wrote a letter to the judge
expressing her displeasure with the judge's conclusion. The husband's mo-
tion was overruled. Had the wife filed a motion for a new trial? She ar-
gued that her letter had that effect. In rejecting this argument, the court
concluded that the letter could not be treated as a motion for a new trial
because it did not request that the judgment be set aside or that the case be
retried.356
Appeal. The niceties of the law with respect to time limits and other intri-
cacies of perfecting an appeal will continue to plague forgetful members of
the bar in spite of some simplification of the rules.357 The lawyer who
347. Id. at 346. See also Sanchez v. Sanchez, 609 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1980, no writ).
348. See 597 S.W.2d at 346.
349. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
350. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
351. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
352. Martinez v. Martinez, 608 S.W.2d 719, 721-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980,
no writ). See also Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966); Craddock v. Sunshine
Bus Lines, 134 Tex. 388. 393, 138 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939).
353. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(a).
354. Id
355. 608 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ dism'd).
356. Id at 262.
357. See Pope & McConnico, supra note 278, at 500-07.
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ignores these procedural details will be defeated by them. 358
Once before a court of civil appeals, however; the careless lawyer may
again be thwarted by the state of the record. For example, if during a trial
a party states in open court that he has no objection and would agree to an
award of twenty-five percent of certain disability retirement benefits to his
spouse, he is estopped from changing his position on appeal. 359
If there are no findings of fact in the record, the appellate court makes
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record in support of
the judgment.360 In cases of an incomplete record due to the absence of
the reporter during part of the trial, the appellant who was present at the
trial is deemed to have waived the lack of a complete record. 361 The ap-
pellant who did not participate in the trial and through no fault of his own
finds himself before the appellate court without a complete record or virtu-
ally no record at all, however, will find the law more solicitous of his situa-
tion.362 Even the appellant who has defaulted in appearing is entitled to a
new trial if no record has been made by which the appellate court can
adjudge even-handedly between the parties. In Fly v. Fy 363 a certain
amount of deception apparently was practiced upon an unsuspecting wife.
After the husband had filed his suit for divorce in 1977, the parties were
reconciled, and the wife was made to understand, or so she alleged under
oath, that her husband's attorney had dismissed the original divorce pro-
ceeding. After the parties separated again, and without any further notice
to the wife, the husband obtained a default divorce on the basis of the
pleading still on file. The record indicated that the court reporter appeared
and started taking down testimony in the case some time after the trial had
begun. Although the wife's attorney tried to get a complete statement of
facts for appeal under rule 377(d),364 the trial judge filed a statement of
facts merely stating that the proceedings had been taken down by the re-
porter with the exception of questions concerning venue. 365 Although the
trial judge's recollection may have been faulty in this regard, the verbatim
358. See Costello v. Costello, 608 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no
writ) (filing of appeal bond is jurisdictional requirement).
359. McGinty v. McGinty, 592 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ
dism'd).
360. Barcelo v. Barcelo, 603 S.W.2d 276, 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1980, writ dism'd); Robbins v. Robbins, 601 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst
Dist.] 1980, no writ); Cousins v. Cousins, 595 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980,
no writ); Cervantes v. Cervantes, 591 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi
1979, no writ), See also Grothe v. Grothe, 590 S.W.2d 238, 239-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1979, no writ) (partial statement of facts).
361. Erger v. Erger, 590 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ
dism'd).
362. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 561 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1978) (husband entitled to new
trial on ground that he was unable to obtain statement of facts from trial court proceeding);
Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1976) (error to affirm judgment of trial court when one
party was unable to obtain statement of facts from lower court).
363. 590 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
364. TEX. R. Civ. P. 377(d). For the purpose of this situation, rule 377(d), though altered
in some respects, has not been changed significantly.
365. 590 S.W.2d at 181.
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transcript of the court reporter supplemented by the judge's recollection
would seem to satisfy precedent on this point.366 The real problem, there-
fore, was the deception that was practiced on the wife and not the state of
the record. The Corpus Christi court of civil appeals concluded: "The
. . . wife was not required to rely on the unaided memory of the trial
judge, who decided the merits of the case, in order to obtain a complete
statement of facts."' 367 Thus, by characterizing the supplementary state-
ment of facts as "mere conclusions of law," the court was able to hold in
favor of the wife.368 Even though the court concluded that the judge's
recollection was faulty in that he failed to mention a restraining order,
concerning which the court conjectured that he must have questioned the
husband, the court's holding seems unjustified in light of the authorities. 369
The appellate court alluded to the implication of fraud involved in the
matter, but rather than pursuing this line of reasoning, it rested its remand
for a new trial on dubious suppositions respecting the state of the record.
In view of results in similar situations, the practical soundness of the
appellant's approach in Fy is illustrated by two other cases. In Ferguson v.
Ferguson 370 the situation was virtually the same as in Fy, except that it
was the wife who had filed for divorce against the husband, and there was
no intimation that she had misled him to believe that she had dismissed
her petition after a purported reconciliation. She proceeded with her suit,
and a divorce was granted upon the husband's default. The attempted
reconciliation was brought to the court's attention. On appeal the court
pointed out rather disingenuously that the husband might have pleaded
condonation. 37' If he had done so, however, he would have had to show
that there was "a reasonable expectation of reconciliation," which in most
circumstances is beside the point.372 The husband might have fared better
by way of a bill of review. That course, however, did not aid a wife in
Sanders v. Jefferson.373 There, the wife complained that the divorce was
procured by fraud, that she and her attorney did not receive notice of the
divorce hearing, and that there was no record upon which the court could
proceed. With regard to this last allegation, the court rejected the wife's
contention in that the rule with respect to the lack of a record applies only
to appeals and not to bills of review. 374 The court explained that "[i]f she
was entitled to a bill of review, she would have no need for a statement of
facts because the action itself would be retried in the bill of review. '375
366. See McKnight, supra note 61, at 125-26; McKnight, Family Law. Husband & Wife,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 111-12 (1978); McKnight, supra note 15, at
110.
367. 590 S.W.2d at 181.
368. Id
369. See note 366 supra.
370. 610 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
371. See id at 560.
372. TEX. R. Civ. P. 308(b).
373. 599 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ dism'd).
374. Id at 664.
375. Id.
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Equitable Bill of Review. Two cases dealt with the effects of a petitioner's
remarriage when a bill of review is sought merely to set aside property and
custody aspects of a divorce decree procured by the other spouse. In
Vinklarek v. Vnklarek376 the appellate court concluded that, although a
petitioner who remarries cannot attack the dissolution of the marriage it-
self because of the benefits bestowed upon him by the decree, he may nev-
ertheless attack the ancillary elements of the decree with respect to the
division of property and matters affecting the parent-child relationship.
377
The court reached this same conclusion in Rose v. Rose.378 Rose differs
from Vinklarek only in the fact that the petitioner in Rose had entered into
an informal marriage, rather than a ceremonial one. The defendant also
urged in Rose that the petitioner had accepted financial benefits under the
decree that barred him from attacking the property division. The court
concluded that this argument was inappropriate because the petitioner was
in necessitous circumstances and had to use whatever benefits were
awarded to him to relieve that condition.379
In Risk v. Risk380 the petitioner complained of intrinsic fraud that alleg-
edly induced him to enter into a property settlement agreement in antici-
pation of divorce. Apart from the fact that the petitioner appears to have
deceived himself in this case, the court ruled that he could not have relied
on the intrinsic fraud of the other party in this instance because allegations
of intrinisic fraud are insufficient grounds for setting aside such agree-
ments.38' Furthermore, because the petitioner had availed himself of sub-
stantial advantages of the property division by way of tax benefits, the
court held that he was barred by that fact from seeking relief by bill of
review. 382
V. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
Property Settlement Agreements. The most significant development in the
law of property settlement agreements is the amendment of the Texas
Constitution, 383 which makes it clear that a property settlement agreement
may effectively provide that particular future income of either spouse from
any source will be the separate property of a spouse as partitioned,384 with-
out any judicial implementation. Hence if a divorce decree is not entered,
376. 596 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).
377. Id at 200.
378. 598 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ dism'd). See also Bragdon
v. Bragdon, 594 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ) (remarried spouse
barred from asserting that prior divorce was void).
379. 598 S.W.2d at 893.
380. 601 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ dism'd).
381. Id. at 744. See also Chapman v. Chapman, 591 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1979, no writ); Bankston v. Bankston, 251 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952,
mand. overr.).
382. 601 S.W.2d at 745.
383. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; see note 59 supra; Comment, The Legal Effect of Mari-
tal Separation Agreements Upon Community Property Status. Is It Time to Amend the Consti-
tutional Defnition of Wife's Separate Property?, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 159 (1980).
384. On this point the authorities were closely divided prior to passage of the amend-
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but the agreement is not made contingent on entry of a decree, the contract
finally governs the rights of the parties. If the agreement is made a part of
a divorce decree, however, the terms of settlement are merged into the
judgment, and the independent standing of the agreement for purposes of
enforcement disappears. 385 The most significant exception to this rule is
the divorce decree that incorporates an agreement that goes beyond the
power of the court to order. The most common example is a contractual
undertaking of one spouse to support the other following divorce. Because
this support term of the agreement maintains its contractual integrity
whether or not incorporated into the decree, it is enforceable by subse-
quent sUit. 3 86 Any other contractual term of a property settlement agree-
ment not incorporated in the decree also is enforceable contractually. 387
The contractual nature of the settlement agreement involving post-di-
vorce periodic support payments is well illustrated by Sorrels v. Sorrels.388
There the parties' divorce was accompanied by a settlement agreement in
which the husband obligated himself to support the ex-wife until her re-
marriage. The parties subsequently remarried each other but were later
divorced a second time. Thereafter the ex-wife sought to enforce the prop-
erty settlement agreement entered into prior to the first divorce. No con-
tention was made that remarriage to each other was intended to be covered
by the specific terms of the agreement. Rather, the ex-husband argued that
as a matter of law the terms of the agreement were dissolved by the second
marriage. The court, nonetheless, found the contractual terms unaffected
by the subsequent marriage.3 89
In Wade v. Wade390 the ex-spouses disputed the construction of a provi-
sion of their property settlement agreement under which the husband was
to pay the wife a fixed percentage of his subsequent "taxable income."' 39'
In this instance the ex-husband had since remarried, and he and his new
wife had filed a joint income tax return. The appellate court concluded
that, by applying objective standards, the settlement agreement referred to
the ex-husband's one half of adjusted gross income for income tax pur-
poses.392
ment. See McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413
(1976).
385. Exparte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1979); see McKnight, supra note 113, at
146-47.
386. See Myrick v. Myrick, 601 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ);
Tewell v. Tewell, 599 S.W.2d 351, 354-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ reed
n.r.e.).
387. See Pierson v. Pierson, 596 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]
1980, no writ).
388. 592 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
389. Id at 695-96. Community property undivided in divorce becomes a tenancy in
common. Remarriage of the parties does not affect this result. Spencer v. Spencer, 589
S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1979, no writ).
390. 592 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
391. See I.R.C. § 63(b).
392. 592 S.W.2d at 700-01.
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In another case393 the ex-wife sued for damages for breach of a property
settlement agreement whereby the ex-husband had agreed to discharge
certain marital debts that were apparently joint liabilities of the parties.
The ex-husband had since become a bankrupt and the debts as to him had
been discharged. After continued harassment by creditors, the ex-wife was
successful in recovering a money judgment against her former spouse for
the amount of the debts he had agreed to discharge. 394
Power to Divide Separate Property. As originally enacted, the Texas stat-
ute of 1841395 excluded from division all significant separate property:
lands and slaves. 396 The language of the divorce act, however, was not
kept current with the new definition of separate property in the constitu-
tion of 1845.397 After the reference to slaves was omitted,398 only lands
were specifically excluded by statute from the court's power of division.
The general rule for division of property had been laid down in Fitts v.
Fitts 399
As the parties in marriage, in this State, very often have each separate
property, and as very generally there is some community property, the
most obvious construction of the Statute is, that the separate property
should be restored to its owner respectively, and that such division of
the community property be made as may seem just and right . ..4
Later in its opinion the supreme court stated that "there would be no ne-
cessity for trenching on the separate property of either partner, for the ben-
efit of the other," because "[b]oth [spouses] would often have separate
property."'40' The court was referring to the Texas population of the mid-
nineteenth century, mostly immigrants, each of whom frequently had sep-
arate property brought with them from other states. But as the population
became more generally native-born, most, if not all, of the assets of a di-
vorcing couple would be community property, and it was very frequently
divided disproportionally in favor of the wife, who by conventional usage,
in almost every instance, was the petitioner and was awarded custody of
any minor children. Her grounds for divorce were the fault of the hus-
band, generally cruelty, and the disproportionate division was justified by
the husband's fault. When community property was inadequate to meet
the wife's needs, the court would occasionally invade the husband's sepa-
rate personalty, if he had separate personalty. This approach gave the di-
vorce courts great flexibility in dividing the property. If the facts seemed
to justify giving the husband a disproportionate share of the community
393. Smith v. Smith, 595 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
394. Id at 652-53.
395. 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony, § 4, at 20, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483, 484 (1898).
396. The wife's paraphernalia went unmentioned, presumably because it was regarded as
unthinkable that she would be deprived of such property.
397. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 19 (1845).
398. Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 2864 (1879).
399. 14 Tex. 443 (1855).
400. Id. at 450.
401. Id at 453.
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estate because it constituted the means of his livelihood, in that case also
the wife might be provided for from the husband's separate personalty. As
often as not, however, the division was based principally on the compara-
tive needs of the wife, an alimony-based criterion, rather than on the hus-
band's fault.
In 1969 the reference to separate realty was omitted from section 3.63402
as part of the general statutory revision. Thereafter, some courts began to
divide separate realty as well as separate personalty. In Eggemeyer v.
Eggemeyer,403 however, the court concluded that the legislative history of
the statute showed that the legislature had not intended to change the law
with respect to separate realty.4°4 The Texas Supreme Court also there
relied on the specific statutory reference to division of the estate of the
parties,40 5 that is, the community, in concluding that separate realty was
excluded from division.40 6 The court also found support for this conclu-
sion in section 14.05 of the Family Code, 40 7 noting the provision therein
that a spouse's property may be administered, not divested, to provide for
the support of children.40 8 Finally, the court relied on constitutional
grounds to support its conclusion. 40 9 The court's reliance on the "due
course of law" clause of the Texas Constitution 410 is not easily compre-
hended.41 1 In Eggemeyer the court also placed reliance on the constitu-
tional definition of separate property41 2 to deny a court the power to
convert the separate property of one spouse into the separate property of
the other. When faced with the question of the division of separate per-
sonalty, the supreme court, persuaded by the force of the constitutional
arguments and the doctrine of stare decisis, reached a consistent conclu-
sion in Campbell v. Campbell413 and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. After a motion for rehearing had been filed, however, the parties
decided to settle their dispute without further litigation. Contrary to its
usual practice of simply dismissing the motion for rehearing, 414 the
supreme court withdrew its opinion and judgment in the case and set aside
the judgments of the courts below. 41 5 One is, therefore, left with the feel-
ing that the court had decided that resting its conclusion on constitutional
grounds was perhaps ill-advised. The realization that deciding the case on
constitutional grounds made its conclusions impervious to legislative
402. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975).
403. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
404. Id. at 139.
405. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975).
406. 554 S.W.2d at 139, 142.
407. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon 1975).
408. 554 S.W.2d at 139.
409. Id at 140-41.
410. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
411. See 554 S.W.2d at 140-41.
412. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
413. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 391, 393 (June 7, 1980).
414. See Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978), motion for rehearing dis-
missed, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 500 (July 22, 1978).
415. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 79, 80 (Nov. 22, 1980).
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change may also have seemed too strict an approach. Two events then
occurred that will affect the adjudication of a subsequent case similar to
Campbell: (1) the electorate adopted the constitutional amendment al-
lowing spouses and persons about to marry to alter the character of their
future acquisitions of earnings and profits, and (2) the composition of the
Texas Supreme Court was significantly changed with the election of two
new members.
A writ of error has been filed in Cameron v. Cameron .416 The property
under consideration in this case consisted of military retirement benefits
and personalty acquired with military pay. Following Campbell, the ap-
pellate court reversed the trial court's award to the wife of the husband's
separate personalty interests, acquired through the husband's employment
when the spouses made their home in a common law jurisdiction.417 A
dissenting judge in another case,418 however, again expressed the view that
such income does not constitute separate property within the Texas consti-
tutional definition and, thus, for purposes of division on divorce. 419
Wages earned by a domiciliary of a separate property state while tempo-
rarily residing in a community property state demand an entirely different
analysis. The character of marital acquisitions is regulated by the law of
domicile, 420 but where that domicile may be is a threshold question of fact
and law that must be determined before the court takes up the question of
division. If the wage earner clearly was domiciled in the non-community-
property state, his earnings while temporarily residing in Texas would be
his separate property. The contrary conclusion in Gaudion v. Gaudion421
is, therefore, mistaken. The modern concept of domicile422 does not re-
quire the court to conclude that a prior domicile has not been lost by a
serviceman long-stationed in Texas merely because the serviceman real-
ized that he might be reassigned and also nursed a hope of returning to the
place of his childhood to retire.
Since its enactment in 1841, the property-division statute423 has pro-
vided that the rights of children shall be considered in making the division.
This factor had been given little attention since Rice v. Rice,424 until it was
resuscitated in McKnight v. McKnight.425 In Young v. Young 4 26 the Texas
416. 608 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ filed).
417. Id at 751.
418. Coote v. Coote, 592 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(Hughes, J., dissenting).
419. Id at 55-56; see Muns v. Muns, 567 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ). See also Sampson, Common Law Property in a Texas Divorce: After Eggemeyer,
the Deluge?, 42 TEX. B.J. 131, 134 (1979).
420. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 257 (1971).
421. 601 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
422. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1971).
423. 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony, § 4, at 20, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483, 484 (1898).
424. 21 Tex. 58 (1858).
425. 535 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), rev'don other grounds, 543 S.W.2d
863 (Tex. 1976).
426. 609 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. 1980).
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Supreme Court held that the right of support of a disabled, unmarried
adult child in the care of a spouse could be considered in making a divi-
sion of property on divorce.4 27 Apparently, therefore, occupancy of the
separate home of one spouse may be given to the other who has the care of
such a child. Thus, a point left open in Eggemeyer may be resolved.
Another issue left open in Eggemeyer is the propriety of putting a lien
on a spouse's separate property to secure payment of an amount ordered
by the court to achieve a proper division of property. In Buchan v.
Buchan428 and again in Day v. Day4 2 9 the Tyler court of civil appeals con-
cluded that fixing a lien on separate property is proper in this situation.
430
Although the separate property on which the lien was placed in Buchan
was a homestead, the lien was for improvements and owelty.43 1 In Day
the property on which the lien was fixed later became a homestead, and
the homestead claim was therefore irrelevant.
432
A separate property problem not yet tackled by the Texas Supreme
Court is that of the characterization and disposition on divorce of separate
corporate shares, the value of which has significantly appreciated during
marriage due to retention of corporate profits that might have been de-
clared as dividends and hence received by the owner of the shares as com-
munity property. Some courts once tended toward an alter ego analysis
433
in cases involving wholly owned or substantially controlled separate cor-
porate entities, with the result that the shares were treated as community
property on divorce. This approach has seemingly given way to an entity
analysis under which the appreciation in value of the separate shares may
constitute a basis for a community property claim for reimbursement in
the process of property division. 434 In Humphrey v. Humphrey,435 for ex-
ample, the appellate court ruled that the trial court had properly refused to
submit to the jury the issue of alter ego of the wholly owned separate cor-
poration in the absence of evidence of a fraudulent purpose to which the
corporation was put.
436
427. Id at 760.
428. 592 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ dism'd).
429. 610 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
430. Id at 198-200; 592 S.W.2d at 371. But see Duke v. Duke, 605 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ dism'd) (applying Eggemeyer, deed of trust lien on husband's
separate property deemed invalid).
431. 592 S.W.2d at 371-72.
432. 610 S.W.2d at 198-99; cf. Spence v. Spence, 455 S.W.2d 365, 369-70 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (where property became a valid home-
stead before abstract of judgment was filed, property was exempt from judgment lien).
433. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 81 (1976);
McKnight, supra note 384, at 448-49.
434. See McKnight, supra note 61, at 136-37. See also Holt v. Holt, 5 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2476, 2477 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1979) (husband not entitled to additional separate
property award for increase in value of his separate investment in incorporated business
because husband had no equity in investment prior to marriage).
435. 593 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ dism'd).
436. Id at 826. For a discussion of the alter ego theory in the context of a community




Exercise of Discretion. The trial court's exercise of its discretion in divid-
ing property ordinarily will not be disturbed by the appellate court,437 but
a particularly one-sided disposition may be. There are three recent cases
of the latter type. In Musick v. Musick 438 neither spouse had any separate
property and the value of the community estate was about $97,000. The
couple had three minor children, and the husband was totally disabled.
The trial court awarded $80,000 in assets to the husband along with virtu-
ally all the debts, totaling approximately $63,000, but he was not ordered
to support the children. The net value of the award to the husband, which
included all productive assets of the estate, amounted to $17,000. The net
value of the award to the wife was also $17,000, but included a $13,000
money judgment against the husband, a mobile home that had been repos-
sessed by the mortgagee prior to the entry of the judgment, and a car that
the husband had allowed to become undrivable. Although the trial court
had endeavored to achieve a seeming balance between the spouses, the
appellate court ruled that the property division was "inequitable and man-
ifestly unjust and unfair" to the wife and accordingly set aside the division
and remanded the case.439 In contrast, in Aronson v. Aronson440 the divi-
sion very much favored the wife. Out of a community estate of $140,000
the wife received assets valued at $93,000 and liabilities of $4,500, whereas
the husband was awarded $37,000 in assets but liabilities amounting to
$48,500. The disparity in the award of assets and liabilities was too great
for the appellate court to regard as fair.441 The facts that the husband had
a present capacity to earn $12,000 a year and the wife had no reasonable
expectation of employment were offset by the husband's age (69) as com-
pared to that of the wife (55). The wife also owned over $7,000 worth of
separate securities and other separate property that produced an income of
$400 a year. The husband had a mere life income of about $1,600 -a year.
The court concluded that these facts could not justify such an uneven divi-
sion of the community assets.442
Erger v. Erger443 is somewhat similar to Aronson. Both spouses were in
their early forties and they had one minor child. No fault was pleaded or
proved. The wife's separate estate was significantly larger than that of the
husband's, and she had a greater earning capacity. The husband had mili-
tary retirement benefits of $900 a month, of which the trial court awarded
him $600 a month. He was also required to pay $250 a month for the
support of the child. The total of the valued assets awarded to the wife
was $46,000, whereas that awarded to the husband was $29,000, including
a note of $17,500 that the husband had executed to the wife for a loan of
437. Gaston v. Gaston, 608 S.W.2d 332, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ);
Walker v. Walker, 608 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).
438. 590 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
439. Id at 586.
440. 590 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
441. Id at 190.
442. Id.
443. 590 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ dism'd).
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her separate property. The appellate court held that this disparity of divi-
sion, without "some reasonable basis," constituted an abuse of discre-
tion.44
An order to pay a sum of money in an instance in which there is no
property, or at least not as much property, to divide must be termed an
alimony award and is hence invalid as against public policy. Cordell v.
Cordell"5 is an example of this rare phenomenon. As a general rule, how-
ever, a money judgment is clearly referable to the property division and
the alimony argument is not made.
446
In Young v. Young 4 4 7 the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the trial
court may consider the fault of either of the parties in dividing the prop-
erty in a fault-based divorce.448 The Corpus Christi court of civil appeals
had already applied this concept in a no-fault divorce context, ruling that
"[ojnce the trier of facts has determined that the statutory grounds for di-
vorce have been met, it is discretionary on the trial judge's part to permit
additional evidence in . . .regard [to the cause of marital difficulties]." 449
In effect the Austin court also allowed the consideration of fraud or bad
faith in making a property division in Colley v. Colley .450 There the appel-
late court speculated that the trial court had concluded that the husband
had not accounted fully for all his property interests and would not dis-
charge his financial obligation to the couple's minor child.45' The appel-
late court, therefore, sustained the division of property substantially in
favor of the wife.
452
More active fraud was practiced in Grothe v. Grothe.4 53 In that case the
husband admitted converting community funds to his personal use with
the intention of depriving the wife of her interest in them. The court ruled
that this conduct on the husband's part supported the disparate division of
the estate in favor of the wife.
454
The Dallas court of civil appeals acknowledged in Murffv. Murff45 5 that
a trial court may consider the necessitous circumstances of the parties in
making a division of property.456 The court found, however, that a court
444. Id at 188.
445. 592 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
446. See Price v. Price, 591 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ). A
money judgment entered against a party as a part of the division of property is not treated as
includable in the recipient's gross income for income tax purposes, nor is it deductible from
the gross income of the paying spouse. Gammill v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 921, 932 (1980);
I.R.C. §§ 71(a)(1), 215(a).
447. 609 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. 1980).
448. Id at 761-62.
449. Brown v. Brown, 599 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no
writ).
450. 597 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
451. Id at 32.
452. Id.
453. 590 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ).
454. Id. at 239-40; see Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1974, no writ).
455. 601 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ granted).
456. Id. at 118 (citing Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974)).
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lacks authority to cure a disparity of income between the spouses.457 Be-
cause the trial court below had given consideration "to 'disparity of in-
come' rather than to the respective 'necessities' of the spouses" the court in
Murf ruled that the property division was manifestly unjust.458 Although
these factors are sometimes spoken of as independent criteria, in the con-
text of the trial court's division they are intimately related. What is re-
ferred to as disparity of income most commonly refers to a spouse's ability
to fulfill future needs, which in turn are related to the circumstances of the
marriage.
Foreign Realty. In In re Glaze459 we are supplied with yet another author-
ity for the proposition, until recently unsupported by reported prece-
dent,460 that a Texas divorce court with personal jurisdiction over a party
may order that party to convey foreign real property in a manner appro-
priate to achieve an equitable division of the community estate.4 6'
Reimbursement. A claim for reimbursement is neither absolute nor for a
fixed amount because it may be reduced or rejected altogether when the
claimant has taken or will take a substantial benefit in the property that
itself has been benefited.462 In dealing with estate tax matters the Internal
Revenue Service often seems entirely oblivious of this rule.463 The princi-
ple of equitable reduction for benefit to the claimant, however, may be
very significant as between spouses in a divorce context.4 64 In the case of a
divorce as well as the death of a spouse, a spouses's separate estate may be
reimbursed for capital contributions made to the welfare of family for-
tunes.4 6 5 Purporting to achieve reimbursement, a divorce court may not,
however, take the fee to separate real property of one spouse and give it to
the other spouse, as such an approach constitutes a divestiture of separate
realty. 466
457. 601 S.W.2d at 118.
458. Id. In MurfJ the court also held that a money judgment should not be employed in
lieu of a division of property when property is available for division. Id. at 121. Such a
conclusion seems lacking in the flexibility necessary to produce a just and right division in
many instances.
459. 605 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
460. See McKnight, supra note 113, at 150-51.
461. 605 S.W.2d at 724.
462. See Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 147-48, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943); accord,
Tester v. Tester, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2737, 2737-38 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 18, 1979).
463. As an example, in formulating Rev. Rul. 80-242, 1980-36 I.R.B. 11, the IRS treated
the community right to reimbursement for payment of premiums on a separate life insur-
ance policy as a fixed amount, without reduction for the benefit that the community claim-
ant, as named beneficiary, had received. In this instance the discrepancy was of no practical
concern to the executor, because any reduction in the community claim would merely have
swelled the separate part of the value of the policy.
464. See Harrell v. Harrell, 591 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979,
no writ); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 56-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, writ dism'd).
465. Schmidt v. Huppman, 73 Tex. 112, 116, 11 S.W. 175, 176 (1889).
466. Bell v. Bell, 593 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no
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Proof of a community claim to reimbursement for improvement of sepa-
rate property is not discharged by merely showing a depletion of commu-
nity funds, even though the owner of the separate property admitted that
some community funds were used for improvement on the separate prop-
erty.467 In fixing the measure of reimbursement for improvements paid by
one marital estate for the benefit of another, there has been a wide dispar-
ity in judicial conclusions. 468 In Pruske v. Pruske469 the court enunciated
the rule that the measure of reimbursement is cost or enhancement, which-
ever is less.470 Thus, in order to recover reimbursement, both amounts
must be proved. In Day v. Day 471 the court appears to have measured
reimbursement merely by cost.472
Although it was once said that a right of reimbursement could not be
secured by a lien put upon a homestead for its own improvement, 473 such a
conclusion seems against principle. The constitution allows the fixing of a
lien upon a homestead for purchase money, as well as taxes and improve-
ments.474 Although the constitutional provision goes on to specify that in
the case of improvements, a lien shall fix "only when the work and mate-
rial are contracted for in writing with the consent of both spouses, in the
case of a family homestead, given in the same manner as is required in
making a sale and conveyance of the homestead," 475 that provision is ref-
erable to transactions with third persons and not between the spouses. In
Buchan v. Buchan ,476 prior to the marriage, the husband had leased a tract
of the wife's property for fifteen years and had constructed a house on the
property as part of the consideration for the lease. The house became the
couple's homestead. In dividing the property, the court put a lien of
$45,000 on the land, that is, for the value of the husband's leasehold inter-
est that was terminated. 4 77 Under the circumstances, the lien on the home-
stead may be characterized as for improvements and owelty.478
Attorney's Fees. The rendering of an award of attorney's fees to one party
as against the other and the fixing of the amount of that award are inci-
dents479 of the division of property and, as such, are within the sound dis-
467. Gaston v. Gaston, 608 S.W.2d 332, 334-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
468. See McKnight, Is There a Right of Reimbursement in Texas?, in MARRIAGE DIsso-
LUTION IN TEXAS ch. C, at 19-27 (State Bar of Texas 1979).
469. 601 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ dism'd).
470. Id. at 748-49.
471. 610 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
472. Id at 198.
473. Barber v. Barber, 223 S.W. 866, 867-68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1920, writ
dism'd). In Howle v. Howle, 422 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no writ), the
ex-wife, who had occupied the premises as a homestead under a divorce decree, sought to
abandon the homestead and claimed a right of reimbursement with a lien on the property
for its payment.
474. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
475. Id
476. 592 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ dism'd).
477. Id. at 371-72.
478. Id
479. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950).
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cretion of the trial judge.480 In this context, a reasonable fee as a quantum
meruit may be granted to an attorney discharged prior to trial, apart from
the attorney actually involved in prosecuting the suit to judgment. 48' In
fixing the amount of the fee 482 the court must determine a fee that is rea-
sonable under the circumstances of the parties and not merely one that is
within the normal and customary charges of an attorney for the services
performed. Thus, in Saums v. Saums 483 the appellate court reversed an
award of an attorney's fee of $7,500 for the representation of a woman who
earned $1,000 a month.484 Although the attorney testified that the case
had taken more time than usual to prepare and that the normal and cus-
tomary fee for a contested divorce case before a jury was between $5,000
and $10,000 in the county in which the case was tried, the appellate court
concluded that the fee was in excess of a reasonable amount.4 85
In Thomas v. Thomas486 the appellate court ordered a remittitur of part
of the award of the wife's attorney's fees to be paid by the husband.487 The
wife had advanced her attorney $2,500 toward his fees, which were agreed
as to amount for time of preparation and trial time. The total amount
charged was $4,050. The court ordered the husband to pay attorney's fees
in the amount of $3,000. Because this amount in addition to that already
paid by the wife exceeded the bill for services by $950, a remittitur of the
latter amount was ordered by the appellate court.488
Division After Divorce. Community property not divided on divorce be-
comes a tenancy in common between the former spouses and is therefore
subject to partition. 489 In Bloom v. Bloom 490 the appellant argued that the
480. Blaylock v. Blaylock, 603 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1980, no writ); Grandinetti v. Grandinetti, 600 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1980, no writ); Cordell v. Cordell, 592 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1979, no writ). In Murffv. Murff, 601 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980,
writ granted), the court concluded that the award of attorney's fees must be an integral part
of the discretionary division of property.
481. Bass v. Bryan, 609 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
482. The 1979 amendment to TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981), stating that a court should take judicial notice of the "usual and customary fees in
such cases," does not appear to be applicable to divorce cases. Attorney's fees, however,
may be awarded to a claimant in a suit for breach of a property settlement agreement pursu-
ant to a 1977 amendment to art. 2226, which provides for the recovery of attorney's fees in
claims arising from a written or oral contract. Id; Brophy v. Brophy, 599 S.W.2d 345, 347
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
483. 610 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ dism'd).
484. Id at 243-44. See also Paugh v. Paugh, 579 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1979, no writ).
485. 610 S.W.2d at 243-44.
486. 603 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
487. Id at 358-59.
488. Id. at 359. For a case involving a suit against an attorney for fraudulently proceed-
ing against a levying officer and his surety in connection with the recovery of a fee awarded,
see Hennigan v. Harris County, 593 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd
n.r.e.).
489. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554-55 (Tex. 1970); Exparle Williams, 160 Tex.
314, 316, 330 S.W.2d 605, 606 (1960); Gray v. Thomas, 83 Tex. 246, 251, 18 S.W. 721, 723
(1892).
490. 604 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ). See also Arrambide v. Ar-
rambide, 601 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1980, no writ).
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disposition of unvested military retirement benefits in 1972, prior to the
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Cearley v. Cearley,4 9 1 was a nullity and
hence that the benefits should be partitioned. The court in Bloom invoked
the doctrine of res judicata to bar the proceeding. 492 In Green v. Doake 493
the divorce decree had been entered in 197 1. The decree provided that the
family home should be sold on such terms as the spouses should find mu-
tually agreeable. After a long lapse of time, however, the parties were un-
able to agree, and the ex-wife brought a suit to partition the property. Res
judicata was argued, but was not pleaded as a defense. The appellate
court, therefore, treated the defense as waived, but stated that even if it
had been pleaded, it would not have been a bar to the proceeding. 494 The
appellate court concluded that all fees and expenses of the sale might be
paid from the proceeds of the sale, before partitioning the remainder, and
that the trial court might adjust the equities bearing on the parties' prop-
erty interest. 495 The court, however, could find no ground for allowing any
of the funds to be paid for attorney's fees. 496 In making a partition after
divorce, as opposed to an equitable division on divorce, the only equities
that may be taken into consideration are those affecting a partition as be-
tween the parties as cotenants. 497
If the decree of divorce does not divide the property, but division is by a
property settlement agreement, no subject matter exists to support a parti-
tion proceeding,49 8 even though the agreement was not filed with the pa-
pers of the divorce proceeding as provided in rule 11.499 The agreement is
independently enforceable as a contract, and fulfillment of its terms is a
bar to a subsequent proceedihg.5s°
The statute of limitation has been raised frequently in response to a peti-
tion for partition of retirement benefits not divided in a divorce decree. If
there has been no repudiation of the petitioner's claim in the interim, how-
ever, a period of limitation cannot begin to run;50 nor can laches be
pleaded as a defense in the absence of any repudiation of the claim.50 2
491. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
492. 604 S.W.2d at 396. See also Harris v. Harris, 605 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
493. 593 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, no writ).
494. Id at 764.
495. Id at 765.
496. Id.
497. Disbrow v. Thibodeaux, 596 S.W.2d 174, 175-76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, no writ).
498. Pierson v. Pierson, 596 S.W.2d 176, 178-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1980, no writ).
499. TEX. R. Civ. P. 1i.
500. Pierson v. Pierson, 596 S.W.2d 176, 178-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1980, no writ).
501. Mooney v. Glasspool, 602 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ
refd n.r.e.). See also Terrell v. Terrell, 609 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1980, no writ); Trahan v. Trahan, 609 S.W.2d 820, 822-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980,
no writ).
502. Mooney v. Glasspool, 602 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ
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Mere passage of time is irrelevant to both defenses. This point is nicely
illustrated by Terrell v. Terrell.503 In Terrell the husband had been receiv-
ing benefits for more than eight years. In the meantime the ex-wife made
no claim to the benefits, but there had also been no repudiation of her
rights. The court ruled that her claim was therefore unaffected by the
lapse of time. 5°4
In Trahan v. Trahan505 the parties were divorced in 1963 and remarried
in 1970. Their second marriage ended in divorce in 1971. The husband
retired from military service between the first divorce and the second mar-
riage. In neither divorce proceeding was the community part of the mili-
tary retirement benefits divided. A money judgment with interest running
from a month after rendition was made against the pensioner for one-half
of the community share of the retirement benefits he had received, reduced
by the amount of federal income taxes the ex-wife would have been obli-
gated to pay on her share of the benefits. The ex-husband was also or-
dered to pay a fixed amount of his monthly benefits to discharge the
money judgment. The appellate court reversed that portion of the trial
court's order that directed the pensioner to make monthly payments, be-
cause violation of the order could not be enforced by contempt in that
those payments were "not from a particular source. 50 6
If the parties are first divorced in a foreign state, remarry, and seek a
second divorce in Texas, the Texas court will apply the foreign law with
regard to property left undisposed in the first divorce. 507 Under Oklahoma
law, however, a divorce decree is a bar to a claim for property not dealt
with in the decree. 50 8 Hence that property is not subject to division in the
second divorce in Texas. 50 9 In Danforth v. Danforth51° the parties were
divorced in Kansas in 1963, but remarried there in 1964. They entered
into a property settlement agreement, incorporated in the Kansas decree,
that provided that the parties would share equally any assets omitted from
their agreement. The military retirement benefits earned by the husband
were omitted in the Kansas decree, as they were in a subsequent Texas
divorce in 1967. The court granted the wife a partition of the retirement
benefits, including those accrued prior to the Kansas divorce.511 The court
reasoned that the settlement agreement had the effect of superseding Kan-
sas law, which would have foreclosed a claim to omitted assets.
5t 2
ref'd n.r.e.). See also Trahan v. Trahan, 609 S.W.2d 820, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1980, no writ).
503. 609 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
504. See id at 844-45.
505. 609 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
506. Id at 824.
507. See McKnight, supra note 61, at 143.
508. Shipp v. Shipp, 383 P.2d 30, 33 (Okla. 1963).
509. Cousins v. Cousins, 595 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ dism'd).
510. 610 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).
511. Id at 184.
512. Id at 184-85.
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Enforcement. In order to achieve enforcement of arrears of temporary ali-
mony and child support, a divorce court in 1973 adjudged the husband in
contempt and ordered him to pay the arrears at the rate of $100 a month.
Several years later the ex-wife brought suit to reduce this order to a money
judgment. The ex-husband argued that the divorce decree was resjudicata
as to this action. The appellate court concluded that reduction to judg-
ment was an appropriate mode of enforcement. 513 For jurisdictional pur-
poses such enforcement may be pursued by a separate suit elsewhere than
in the divorce court because it is not "a matter incident to divorce or an-
nulment proceedings" as that phrase is used in acts defining the jurisdic-
tion of family courts. In Day v. Day514 an ex-wife sought to foreclose a
lien for a money judgment that the divorce court had fixed on realty of the
ex-husband. The Texas Supreme Court pointed out that the judgment
creditor might either seek a writ of execution from the trial court to en-
force the lien or proceed in a separate suit to foreclose it.515
In Exparte Gorena516 the Texas Supreme Court held that an agreed
judgment with respect to division of property and child support payments
"is no longer merely a contract between private individuals but is the judg-
ment of the court."'517 Hence, the court concluded that the agreement
merges into the judgment for purposes of enforcement. 518 Further, the
court made abundantly clear the point that the exercise of contempt power
to enforce such agreed judgments is not limited to matters related to child
support.519 The court also approved 520 the decision of the San Antonio
court of civil appeals in Exparle Anderson 52 ' to the effect that an order to
pay the ex-spouse directly is just as enforceable as one to pay money into
the registry of the court. The supreme court had previously held in Ex
parte Sutherland522 that an order to pay money into the registry of the
court is enforceable by contempt.523
513. Fowler v. Stone, 600 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980,
no writ) (dictum). Because res judicata had not been pleaded, the court properly stated that
the issue was waived. Id A checklist of steps by which enforcement of temporary alimony,
child support, and foreign alimony awards may be achieved by garnishment of federal mili-
tary retirement pay is provided in Shovlin, Guidelinesfor Garnishment of Military Retirement
Pay, 43 TEX. B.J. 215 (1980). For an instance of enforcement of a foreign alimony decree in
Texas, see Parker v. Parker, 593 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1980,
no writ).
514. 603 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. 1980).
515. Id at 215-16.
516. 595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979). See also McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279 (Tex.
1979).
517. Id at 844.
518. See id
519. Id at 844-45.
520. Id at 847.
521. 541 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976), discussed in McKnight, supra
note 15, at 123-24.
522. 526 S.W.2d 536 (1975).
523. Id. at 539. In Gorena the court also explained that "the controlling factor" in Ex
parte Yates, 387 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1965), was the fact that the contemnor "was required to
pay money that he had not yet earned." 595 S.W.2d at 846; accord, Exparte Chacon, 607
S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980). The facts and order in Yates were very
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In any case, a judgment must be final in the sense that no appeal from it
has been taken before civil contempt proceedings may be used to enforce
it. In Exparte Bible524 the husband was ordered to execute a deed to cer-
tain realty in favor of his wife within ten days of the signing of the decree.
The court ruled that his appeal from the judgment effectively foreclosed a
contempt citation for his willful disobedience of the order.525
In Exparte Weathery 526 the relator was confined for failure to obey a
temporary order of a divorce court to pay a sum into the registry of the
court for the discharge of certain debts, including mortgage installments
on the family home. In Exparte Chaeon527 the husband was jailed for
failure to comply with the court's decree ordering him to pay past-due
income taxes. In both instances the relator was ordered discharged be-
cause his confinement constituted imprisonment for debt in violation of
the Texas Constitution. 528
In Chacon the trial court awarded the wife all the household furnishings
at a particular address. 529 In the absence of a further order directing deliv-
ery of particular furnishings to her, however, the court held that the hus-
band could not be held in contempt for failure to comply. 530 Ex parte
Austin531 also involved a citation for contempt of a nonexistent order. In
the divorce decree the wife was awarded a particular amount of money on
deposit in a savings account that the husband maintained at his place of
employment. The parties later agreed that the ex-husband would with-
draw the funds in the account, deposit them into a checking account and
then give his ex-wife a check on the latter account. All this was done, but
on presentation of the check by the ex-wife there were insufficient funds in
the checking account to pay the check. The ex-husband was jailed for con-
tempt. In releasing him, the court said that in carrying out the ex-wife's
directions to procure the funds awarded to her by the decree, the ex-hus-
band was not in violation of the court order, even that part of it that or-
dered him to "execute all instruments necessary to effect this decree. ' 532
To achieve the results intended, the decree could have ordered the hus-
band to procure checks from his savings account made payable to his wife,
peculiar, and this observation by the supreme court should not be construed to mean that
any order to make periodic payments to achieve an equitable division of property is not
enforceable by contempt. See McKnight, supra note 113, at 156. Such an overbroad read-
ing is reflected in Ex parte Weatherly, 605 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1980).
524. 596 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980).
525. Id at 207-08; accord, Ex parte Valdez, 521 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1975).
526. 605 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1980).
527. 607 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980).
528. Id at 318-19; 605 S.W.2d at 663; see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
529. In a different context, Henderson v. Priest, 591 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1979, no writ), held that if realty awarded to a spouse is described only by street address and
number, that description is sufficiently definite to pass title to the property. Id at 636.
530. 607 S.W.2d at 319.
531. 597 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980).
532. Id at 454-55.
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or to procure one made payable to him that he would in turn be ordered to
endorse to his wife for payment. Failure to comply with either order
would have subjected the husband to coercion for compliance.
Effects of Bankruptcy on Property Division. Bankruptcy judges are very
careful to see that bankruptcy proceedings do not interfere with the efforts
of a divorce court to divide property, although one of the spouses may
attempt to use a divorce proceeding for that purpose. In re Moore5 33 in-
volved such an effort. Immediately following the divorce decree that
awarded her a farm, the ex-wife leased the farm to a tenant. The husband
perfected his appeal and thereupon moved onto the land and dispossessed
the tenant. The divorce court then granted a restraining order against the
ex-husband for interfering with the property and set an injunction hearing.
The ex-husband responded by filing a petition in bankruptcy and sought
removal of the dispute to the bankruptcy court.534 The bankruptcy court
remanded the case to the state court for an orderly completion of its pro-
ceeding.535
Bringing a proceeding in bankruptcy may not succeed in snarling the
division of property on divorce, but such a proceeding has been used in an
attempt to undo obligations with respect to property imposed by the di-
vorce court. In Day v. Day5 36 the divorce court fixed a lien on the hus-
band's separate realty to pay a money judgment to the wife for the
adjustment of equities in the property division. 537 The ex-husband then
sought to have his unsecured debts discharged in bankruptcy. The bank-
ruptcy court, however, deferred to the state court for a determination of
whether the obligation was secured or unsecured.5 38 In the ex-wife's con-
current proceeding for enforcement of her claim, her interest was adjudged
secured. 539
If the ex-spouse is not named as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding
following divorce, the bankruptcy decree has no effect with respect to obli-
gations imposed by the divorce court in regard to the other ex-spouse, al-
though the bankrupt's liability to other creditors that the bankrupt may
have been ordered by the decree to pay may have been discharged. 540 If
the ex-husband's liability to his ex-wife is properly before the bankruptcy
court, however, the effect of the court's decree is to discharge property ob-
ligations between them. These obligations may be embodied in a divorce
533. 5 B.R. 67 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Tex. 1980).
534. 28 U.S.C. § 1478 (Supp. 11 1978).
535. 5 B.R. at 69; see In re Tidwell, 4 B.R. 100 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Tex. 1980); Cowgill v.
White, 543 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also In
re Washington, 623 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir. 1980).
536. 610 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
537. See notes 429-32 supra and accompanying text.
538. 610 S.W.2d at 197.
539. Id at 199.
540. Smith v. Smith, 595 S.W.2d 631, 632-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no
writ).
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decree or a property settlement; but if the obligation created by either
means was created to provide support rather than merely to achieve a divi-
sion of property, the liability is not dischargeable. 541
541. In re Fox, 5 B.R. 317, 320-21 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Tex. 1980) (court ordered division of
military retirement benefits); Harris v. Harris, 605 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [lst Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (property settlement agreement); see In re Robinson,
634 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1980); Melichar v. Ost, 7
B.R. 951 (D. Md. 1980); In re Allen, 4 B.R. 617 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Tenn. 1980); Foltz, The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the Discharge of Texas Property Division Awards, 43
TEX. B.J. 873 (1980). See also Rule v. Rule, 612 F.2d 1098 (8th Cir. 1980).
Although probably attributable to the state of the pleadings in that case, it is difficult to
understand the court's conclusion in Harris, 605 S.W.2d at 688, that the bankruptcy dis-
charge was effective as to payments due before bankruptcy in spite of the court's reasoning
that those becoming due subsequently were not affected by the discharge.
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